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Access Liability in the Open Wi-Fi Era
MATTHEW BIERLEIN*
Burgeoning technological development presents new and ever-evolving
challenges for how the law confronts an Internet savvy society. The
proliferation of wireless networking exemplifies the tension between
promoting technological growth and ensuring legal protection. Wi-Fi
enables greater freedom of access, fostering the use of the Internet in an
increasing number of everyday tasks. However, open wireless networks can
be susceptible to unwanted access by those seeking to hack into a computer
on the network or to use the network for an unlawful purpose. Though the
law adequately addresses such malevolent access, it remains unclear how
the law treats ordinary users who happen across a wireless network to surf
the web.
This Note proposes presumptive legal access to open wireless networks as a
means to balance technological growth and security. Federal and state laws
address access conduct, but the language and degree of enforcement of
these statutes differ. This may confuse users and discourage access. Making
access to an open wireless network presumptively legal, while at the same
time providing protection for secured networks, encourages network
providers to take responsibility for enabling security mechanisms, mitigates
user confusion, and promotes access. Such a result may represent an
appropriate equilibrium of promoting wireless growth and building
wireless security.
I. INTRODUCTION
On the night of April 20, 2005, Richard Dinon noticed something strange
while taking out his trash.' The muted glow of a laptop emanating from an
SUV parked outside of his home caught the St. Petersburg, Florida resident's
eye.2 He walked up to the car and saw a man abruptly close his laptop upon
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I Rob Kelley, Man Charged with Wireless Trespassing, MONEY, July 7, 2005,
http://money.cnn.com/2005/07/07/technology/personaltech/wireless-arrest/index.htm.
2 Alex Leary, Wi-Fi Cloaks a New Breed of Intruder, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 4,
2005, at IA.
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noticing Richard's presence. 3 Richard returned to his house, and at first
dismissed the stranger as perhaps someone performing census work.4 But
when Richard turned on his home computer, he noticed strange icons on his
desktop.5 These strange icons aroused Richard's suspicion that the man
outside may be accessing his computer.6 Later that night, when Richard
returned from taking his girlfriend home, the SUV remained parked outside
his home. 7 At this point, Richard decided to call the police. 8
The St. Petersburg police arrested the SUV's driver, Benjamin Smith III,
and charged him with violating a state computer crime statute. 9 Florida law
prohibits accessing a computer network without authorization and classifies
such conduct as a third degree felony. 10 Although prosecutors are unsure
what sentence they will seek, if Benjamin is convicted, he faces a potential
five year prison sentence. 1
The law's treatment of the relatively new phenomenon of wireless
networking reflects important economic and policy decisions regarding the
growth and use of the Internet. The Internet has become entrenched in the
everyday lives of many Americans. 12 Wireless networking expands the reach
and function of the Internet by breaking through physical boundaries; users
no longer must physically connect to a network, but may gain access via
radio frequencies. 13 Unfortunately, it remains unclear how exactly the law
3 Kelley, supra note 1.
4 Leary, supra note 2.
5 Kelley, supra note 1.
6Id.
7 Leary, supra note 2.
8
Id.
9 Kelley, supra note 1; see also Dave Gussow, Wireless 'Mooching' Raises Issues of
Security, Ethics, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 1, 2005, at ID; Henry J. Gomez, Can't
See It, But Stealing's Easy for Wi-Fi Poachers, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, July 27, 2005, at
Cl.
10 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 815.06 (West 2006).
11 Kelley, supra note 1.
12 See Richard Drezen, Editor's Note, A Dot-Com World; In Just 5 Years, the
Internet has Gone from the Strange to the Standard, WASH. POST, May 17, 2000, at G 1
(noting the "Internet's profound impact on everyday life, from how we work and play to
what we wear and even what we dream about"); Mark Baechtel, The Internet: What a
Mesh!, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 1996, at B6 ("For a huge and ever-growing number of
people, the Internet has become.., so necessary a part of everyday life that it's easy to
take for granted."); Tom Zeller Jr., The Internet's Future? It Depends on Whom You Ask,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2005, at C4. See generally THE INTERNET IN EVERYDAY LIFE
(Caroline Haythornthwaite & Barry Wellman eds., 2002); JAMES E. KATZ & RONALD E.
RICE, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF INTERNET USE: ACCESS, INVOLVEMENT, AND
INTERACTION (2002).
13 See infra Part II for a description of wireless networking technology.
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treats wireless access. This confusion reflects the difficulties of defining how
the law applies to new technologies and the potential complications caused
by making this determination.
The Benjamin Smith case raises significant questions about the legality
of wireless access, the appropriate relationship between the law and
emerging technology, and, in a much broader sense, the practical
implications of regulating technology in an Internet society. While the
average person will not likely feel much sympathy for Benjamin Smith's
predicament-that he parked his SUV outside a stranger's home feels a bit
unsavoryl 4-- his case has far-reaching implications for casual wireless
users. 15 If Benjamin Smith is subject to prosecution, what happens to those
average Americans who unknowingly log in to their neighbor's network or
happen across a wireless signal at a park, hotel, or other public space?
The legality of access presents the most pressing question to Benjamin
Smith. His case turns on whether the law classifies access of an open
wireless network as criminal conduct. 16 Such access may fall under the
auspices of federal and state statutory law (as well as common law doctrines
in the case of civil liability).17
Federal and state laws in the area of unauthorized access present a
confusing regime of statutes with varying scope. At the federal level, the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 18 may be construed to encompass
unauthorized access conduct. State laws vary significantly; some states
appear to absolve users from liability for open wireless access, while other
states set a low threshold of conduct for liability to attach. 19 But the majority
of state statutes remain unclear as to users' culpability for accessing an open
14 Gussow, supra note 9 (Smith "doesn't appear to be the best poster child for Wi-Fi
freedom.").
15 See Michel Marriott, Hey Neighbor, Stop Piggybacking My Wi-Fi, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 5, 2006, § 1, at 1. ("Piggybacking, the usually unauthorized tapping into someone
else's wireless Internet connection, is no longer the exclusive domain of pilfering
computer geeks or shady hackers cruising for unguarded networks. Ordinarily upstanding
people are tapping in. As they do, new sets of Internet behaviors are creeping into
America's popular culture."). Interestingly, in identifying open wireless access as a
pertinent social issue, Marriott presupposes that using an open wireless network is
unauthorized; see also Steve Hargreaves, Stealing Your Neighbor's Net, MONEY, Aug.
10, 2005,
http://money.cnn.com/2005/08/08/technology/personaltech/internet-piracy/index.htm.
16 In Benjamin's case, the court's only concern lies with the application of Florida
law, as prosecutors charged him with violation of state unauthorized access law; no
charges were brought under federal law. See Kelley, supra note 1.
17 See infra Part VI (discussing the application of the law to open Wi-Fi access).
18 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000 & Supp. II
2002).
19 See infra Part VI.B.
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wireless network. 20 The common law further complicates matters-some
courts have shown a willingness to extend doctrines that have traditionally
applied solely to tangible property, to encompass a variety of conduct on the
Intemet. 21
The inconsistent legal response to open wireless access leads to user
confusion and may negatively impact technological development. Typically,
hardware providers ship wireless access points with a default setting
disabling security.22 Hardware companies have little incentive to alter default
settings, or further, expend significant resources developing an appropriate
security regime amidst a climate of contradictory laws.23 New technologies
such as WiMax, 24 which will allow wireless access over a significantly
greater range, could further exacerbate this confused security environment.
If courts construe the law to render open wireless access illegal, it may
stunt a significant means of access to the Internet, thereby diminishing the
Internet's overall value. The value of Internet content and the efficiency of
the Internet's functioning directly relate to the number of its users.25 If users
could be criminally or civilly liable for open wireless access, it could create a
disincentive for logging on to the network and contributing in the Internet
arena-even the mere specter of illegality may negatively impact the value of
the Internet.
Open wireless access constitutes one aspect of a growing debate over the
control of the Internet. Increased use of the Internet has revealed a range of
stakeholders in Internet content and infrastructure, beyond internet service
providers and users. For example, several municipalities seek to provide free
or low cost wireless access via city-wide wireless networks. 26 Additionally,
telecommunications companies are beginning to balk at the idea that
customers use their fiber optic cable and broadband pipe, the foundation for
communication over the Internet, without concern for compensation for the
20 See infra Part VI.B.
21 See infra Part VI.C.
22 James Coates, Wi-Fi Hackers Find Routes Easily; Path Tough to Block, CHI.
TRIB., July 10, 2005, § 5, at 2; Alan S. Key, WiFi's Widening World, WASH. POST, Dec.
22, 2002, at H7.
23 See Jonathan Krim, WiFi is Open, Free and Vulnerable to Hackers, WASH. POST,
July 27, 2003, at Al. Krim notes a T-Mobile spokesman who states that the company
does not use encryption, but instead encourages individuals to use firewall software or
other forms of protection. Id.
24 See Henry Fountain, Pre-N's and MIMO's: The Lingo of Wireless, N.Y. TIMES,
May 4, 2005, at G3.
25 GEORGE GILDER, TELECOSM: How INFINITE BANDWIDTH WILL REVOLUTIONIZE
OUR WORLD 73 (2000) (citing Metcalfe's law, which holds that "[t]he value of a network
rises in proportion to the power of all the machines attached to it").
26 See infra note 37.
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heavy amount of data transmitted. 27 Answering the question of the legality of
open wireless access requires consideration of a key question germane to the
broader debate of Internet control: should "owners" of wireless networks be
afforded property rights in these networks or should wireless networks
remain in the commons, with open access to the public at large?
This Note argues in favor of presumptively legal access for open
wireless networks. Keeping wireless networks open fosters technological
development and furthers Internet growth by giving users absolute clarity
about the legality of their access. In turn, these technological gains and
Internet growth provide substantial value to society. The current regime of
federal and state statutory provisions, as well as common law doctrines, is
muddled at best. This unintelligible mix of pertinent law may hinder the
development of wireless technology and stunt the accompanying social
benefits this technology may bring.
Before addressing the issue of open wireless access, one must consider
what the term means. Part II examines the wireless world in which we live.
Wireless networking represents an emerging technology that already
fundamentally alters how the Internet permeates people's daily lives. This
Part provides the basics of wireless networking: the technological
underpinnings of wireless, the types and functions of wireless networks,
security issues, and the various types of wireless network users. This
foundation becomes important in understanding the law and policy
surrounding wireless networking.
The next three Parts address the law surrounding unauthorized access to
wireless networking. Part III examines the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
and Part IV considers the state statutory law pertinent to the issue of open
wireless access. The federal government and all fifty states have enacted
laws that in some way address unauthorized access.28 However, these laws
differ in important ways that create confusion regarding the culpability of
users for open wireless access. Part V focuses on the common law doctrine
of trespass to chattels and how it relates to open wireless access. Although
rooted in tort law, courts have shown a willingness to construe trespass to
chattels to include electronic trespass.
27 Arshad Mohammed, Verizon Executive Calls for End to Google's 'Free Lunch,'
WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2006, at D1 (quoting Verizon senior vice president and deputy
general counsel John Thorne as stating "[t]he network builders are spending a fortune
constructing and maintaining the networks that Google intends to ride on with nothing
but cheap servers. It is enjoying a free lunch that should, by any rational account, be the
lunch of the facilities providers."). Such rhetoric is part of the growing debate on network
neutrality, which focuses on whether telecommunications companies may charge
different prices to different users for access to the companies' networks. Jeffrey H.
Birnbaum, No Neutral Ground in this Internet Battle, WASH. POST, June 26, 2006, at D1.
28 See infra Parts III, IV.
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Part VI addresses how federal and state statutory law and the common
law may apply to open wireless access. On the statutory side, user culpability
depends on the interpretation of the terms "access" and "authorization," as
well as damage determinations. The viability of the tort of trespass to chattels
depends largely on a court's willingness to extend the doctrine to electronic
conduct. After considering how these laws could apply, the next Part turns to
the more important question-how should the law apply to open wireless
access?
Part VII provides a thoughtful consideration of the policy and economic
issues surrounding open wireless access. From a theoretical perspective,
wireless networking technology falls somewhere on a continuum of conduct.
At one end of the continuum lies activity such as listening to the radio; at the
other end lie physical property conceptions such as looking in a
homeowner's window. The challenge arises in determining where wireless
networking fits on this continuum. Finally, Part VII sets forth and analyzes a
model unauthorized access statute that provides for the presumptive legal
access of open wireless networks.
II. THE WIRELESS WORLD
Wi-Fi (short for wireless fidelity)29 represents a relatively new and
rapidly growing technology. Wi-Fi refers to wireless local area networks,
30
or WLANs, which connect users to the Internet by means of radio or infrared
frequencies. 31 These networks require the network operator to install a short-
range radio tower, referred to as a wireless access point ("WAP"), 32 which
sends and receives data to and from user devices that are equipped with
hardware capable of receiving the signal from the access point.3
3
29 See Fountain, supra note 24. Originally, Wi-Fi did not stand for wireless fidelity.
The Wi-Fi Alliance, in conjunction with the Interbrand Corporation, coined the term to
describe WLAN products based on IEEE 802.11 standards. Wi-Fi is a trademark of the
Wi-Fi Alliance, which is a trade organization that certifies equipment for compliance
with wireless standards. Wikipedia.org, WiFi, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wi_fi (last
visited Sept. 8, 2006).
30 For the purposes of this Note, Wi-Fi, wireless network, WLAN, and hotspots, see
infra note 36, will be used interchangeably.
31 Wi-Fi: Unplugging Devices, CNET NEWS.COM, Nov. 3, 2003,
http://news.com.con/Wi-Fi:+Unplugging+devices/2100-7351_3-5072011 .html; see also
KAVEH PAHLAVAN & PRASHANT KRiSHNAMURTHY, PRINCIPLES OF WIRELESS NETWORKS
18-19 (2002).
32 Patrick S. Ryan, War, Peace, or Stalemate: Wargames, Wardialing, Wardriving,
and the Emerging Market for Hacker Ethics, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 7, 20 (2004),
http://www.vjolt.net/archives/php?issue- 19 [hereinafter War, Peace or Stalemate].
33 Id.
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Wi-Fi networks typically operate on common standards set by the
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers ("IEEE"). These standards,
802.11b, 802.11 a, and 802.11g, all use free unlicensed radio frequencies,
allowing users to connect to Wi-Fi networks for free.34
Wi-Fi networks may be implemented by a variety of operators and in a
variety of contexts. Private residences and businesses deploy wireless
networks for use in the home or office. Other businesses directly provide
wireless networks in public areas such as airports, coffee shops, hotels, and
convention centers. 35 Collectively, these networks create "hotspots" in
suburban areas and business districts, which provide wireless access to the
public. 36 Beyond hotspots, several municipalities currently offer or have
begun to explore plans to provide public Wi-Fi access. 37
34 These standards dictate the rate of data transfer, with 802.11 b allowing a
maximum transfer rate of eleven megabits per second ("mbps") rate, and 802.11 a and
802.1 Ig allowing transfer at a fifty-four mbps rate (although the effective transfer rate
stands at approximately half of these maximums). Id. New standards are in development,
notably WiMax, an IEEE 802.16e standard for wireless broadband. See Fountain, supra
note 24; see also Michael Singer, Intel Pushes WiMax Around the Globe, CNET
NEWS.COM, Nov. 10, 2005,
http://news.com.com/Intel+pushes+WiMax+around+the+globe/2100-7351_3-
5944874.html.
35 Robert V. Hale II, Wi-Fi Liability: Potential Legal Risks in Accessing and
Operating Wireless Internet, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 543, 543-
44 (2005).
36 Id. Wi-Fi networks accessible to the public are commonly known as "hotspots";
several websites provide listings of the hotspots available in a given locale. See
WiFinder, http://www.wifinder.com (last visited Sept. 8, 2006); JiWire,
http://www.jiwire.com (last visited Sept. 8, 2006); WiFiMaps, http://www.wifimaps.com
(last visited Sept. 8, 2006); Wi-FiHotSpotList.com, www.wi-fihotspotlist.com (last
visited Sept. 8, 2006).
37 Esme Vos, Second Anniversary Report, MuniWireless.com, July 2005 at 5-7,
http://muniwireless.com/reports/docs/July2005report.pdf. The report identifies several
regions and municipalities that already make use of publicly accessible Wi-Fi networks,
as well as others planning projects. Municipal Wi-Fi is a complex issue, encompassing
technology, economics, privacy, and a variety of other interests. Municipalities must
determine whether Wi-Fi will be provided free of charge or at a cost. For example, the
Wireless Philadelphia project plans to offer residents service for twenty dollars a month
(with low income residents paying ten dollars a month). Richard Siklos, What We Have
Here is a Failure to Communicate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2005, § 3, at 3. San Francisco is
considering proposals from twenty-six companies, including Google and MetroFi; both
have offered to construct a WiFi network for free. Ryan Kim, Wireless System is Closer;
S.F. Officials Ready to Request Proposal from 26 Vendors, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 9, 2005, at
D3. In turn, telecoms have asserted that municipal wireless may constitute unfair
competition and have begun to lobby for legislation limiting or banning such projects.
See Michael Hiltzik, Fed-Up Cities Seek to Provide Net Access, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20,
2005, at Cl; Bob Keefe, EarthLink: Latest Deal Raises Profile; Anaheim to Get
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Since its introduction, Wi-Fi usage has seen significant growth. One
survey estimates that home wireless use will jump from around 9 million in
2004 to approximately 28 million in 2008.38 Outside the household, industry
analysts estimate that by 2008, around 22 million users will log on to over
53,000 available hotspots within the United States.39 These statistics indicate
the degree to which wireless has, and will, become a fundamental component
of many Americans' lives. 40
This Note examines a particular aspect of the Wi-Fi landscape: the
legality of user access to an open wireless network. An open wireless
network consists of an unsecured wireless network that allows users to have
roaming access to the Internet.41 Wireless networking equipment allows
consumers to password protect, encrypt, or otherwise disguise their
individual Wi-Fi network. Users have the option of either encrypting the
wireless signal (which would require someone attempting to access the
network to have the encryption key) or implementing password protection
(which would require a potential user to enter a password to gain access).
Additionally, consumers can change or hide the network name.42 These
settings provide options for the consumer to secure his or her wireless
network.
Despite the added security these options present, the factory settings for
wireless equipment typically do not activate these protections and consumers
'Showcase' Wireless Net, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 27, 2005, at F1; Thomas Ott,
Cleveland Heights Wants to Offer Wireless Internet, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 11,
2005, at B3; Vikas Bajaj, Legislature Could Revamp Telecom Policy, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, May 13, 2005, at ID. The economics and legality of municipal wireless deserves
exploration in its own right and is outside the scope of this Note.
38 Rebecca Lieb, Wi-Fi Moves In, CLIKZ NETWORK, Oct. 4, 2004,
http://www.clickz.com/stats.old/markets/wireless/article.php/3416331; see also
PAHLAVAN & KRIsHNAMURTHY, supra note 31, at 432-33 (noting that "the number of
home networks... is expected to almost double every year").
39 Matthew Yi, Wi-Fi Hits the Spot: Businesses Find Wireless Internet Connection
Entices Customers to Stay and Pay a Little Longer, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 25, 2003, at El.
40 One observer has also raised questions about the impact of Wi-Fi on the "third
place," public spaces that wireless may transform into conduits for virtual communities.
Stephanie Shapiro, Out Working, BALT. SUN, Apr. 18, 2004, at IN; see also K. DANIEL
WONG, WIRELESS INTERNET TELECOMMUNICATIONS 1-3 (2005).
41 See Benjamin D. Kern, Whacking, Joyriding and War-Driving: Roaming Use of
Wi-Fi and the Law, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 101, 104 (2004).
42 The network name, or SSID (Service Set Identifier), identifies the wireless signal
broadcast by the consumer. The default setting typically labels the network "default" or
the brand name of the wireless equipment. James Coates, Wi-Fi Hackers Find Routes
Easily, CHI. TRIB., July 10, 2005, § 5, at 2. If a consumer chooses not to broadcast the
network name, a user must know the name of the network in order to gain access.
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rarely enable these features. 43 Consumers may choose not to engage the
security measures for a variety of reasons: (1) technological intimidation,"
(2) a desire to share Internet access with neighbors or the general public, 45
(3) a lack of awareness of the risks associated with an unsecured network,46
or (4) a lack of concern for the risks that an unsecured network presents.47
When the manufacturer or consumer does not enable these protective
mechanisms, the wireless network remains unsecured. Regardless of their
reasons, a majority of users leave their Wi-Fi networks unsecured, allowing
access by a variety of different users.48
Popular culture has provided a colorful lexicon for the various users that
may access open Wi-Fi networks, including: joyriders, wardrivers, accidental
users, and hackers. Joyriders use Wi-Fi connections outside of their home or
business to engage in typical Internet activities such as web surfing and
email.49 Wardrivers use software that is freely available on the Internet to
actively search for homes and businesses that provide an open wireless signal
beyond the walls of their establishments, then chart or post these hotspots on
the Internet.50 In some instances, the wardriving software functions in a
manner whereby the user does not technically access the wireless network. In
others, the wardriver engages in essentially the same level of access as a
joyrider. Accidental users quite literally access an open wireless network by
happenstance, often thinking they are accessing their own home or office
43 One survey notes that by 2007, upwards of eighty percent of U.S. residential
WLANs will be unsecured. Matt Hines, Worried About Wi-Fi Security?, CNET
NEWS.COM, Jan. 19, 2005, http://news.com.com/Worried+about+Fi+security/2100-
7347_3-5540969.html?tag=nefd.lede.
44Id.
45 See Marriott, supra note 15. Marriott interviews one Chicago Internet subscriber
who describes leaving her network open as "sticking it to the man." Id.; see also Kern,
supra note 41, at 104.
46 See Kern, supra note 41, at 104.
47 Id. Consumers generally misunderstand or are apathetic toward wireless security.
Id. However, security risks are cause for concern. For instance, using freely available
software, one wardriver was able to connect to an unsecure corporate wireless network
and freely access email, user names, passwords, and other company information. Corilyn
Shropshire, Hot Spots for Hackers: Wireless Networks, PITrSBURGH POST-GAZETrE, Mar.
27, 2005, at CI.
48 See Hines, supra note 43.
49 Id.
50 See Gomez, supra note 9; War, Peace or Stalemate, supra note 32, at *22-23.
The author places wardrivers into the following categories: "(1) they innocently wish to
gain free wireless access in their neighborhoods, perhaps at a local coffee shop; (2) they
have commercial motivations and hope to sell security services; or (3) they have
dishonest motives and hope to surreptitiously access networks [sic] information, send
anonymous spam, or acquire illegal data." Id. at *23-24.
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network.51 All of these users may be distinguished from hackers, who access
wireless networks for a destructive or malicious purpose, such as data theft,
spamming, or other illegal conduct.52 This Note focuses on joyriders-those
who intentionally access the Internet to engage in normal Internet activities.
53
Federal and state statutory law, as well as the common law, may implicate
joyriding.
III. FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW: THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE
ACT
At the federal level, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA") 54
criminalizes certain acts of unauthorized internet access.55 The CFAA
prohibits specific conduct relating to financial records, nonpublic
51 See Kern, supra note 41, at 104-05.
52 Id.
53 Non-hacking wardrivers essentially engage in the same conduct as joyriders,
making the distinction between the two categories functionally irrelevant. Similarly,
accidental users typically engage in approximately the same conduct and thus are
encompassed by the analysis of joyriders.
54 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000 & Supp. II
2002).
55 User access of an open Wi-Fi network represents conduct that intuitively seems to
fall under a range of federal laws. However, many provisions regulating internet use
target specific conduct, such as the Child Pornography Prevention Act, the
Communications Act. and copyright law.
Perhaps most pertinent to the discussion of Wi-Fi is the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act ("ECPA"). Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511
(2000). The ECPA amended the Federal Wiretap Act to provide protection against the
unauthorized interception of electronic communications. Specifically, the ECPA imposes
criminal and civil sanctions on any person who "intentionally intercepts, endeavors to
intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire,
oral, or electronic communication." § 2511 (1)(a). On its face, this provision would seem
to apply to Wi-Fi network access. See Hale, supra note 35, at 550-52. But see Kern,
supra note 41, at 136-40.
However, the ECPA provides numerous exceptions, and goes on to state that it shall
not be unlawful "for other users of the same frequency to intercept any radio
communication made through a system that utilizes frequencies monitored by individuals
engaged in the provision or the use of such system, if such communication is not
scrambled or encrypted." 18 U.S.C. § 251 1(2)(g)(v) (2000). A Wi-Fi network protected
by encryption is by definition no longer an open Wi-Fi network. Thus, this provision
enables access to unprotected, and hence open, wireless networks. Going even further, if
open wireless networks are assumed public, the ECPA allows any person "to intercept or
access an electronic communication made through an electronic communication system
that is configured so that such electronic communication is readily accessible to the
general public." § 251 l(2)(g)(i).
[Vol. 67:11231132
POLICING THE WIRELESS WORLD
government computers, and viruses, among others. 56 The most generally
applicable provisions require that a user intentionally access a network
without authorization. 57 The two provisions most pertinent to the issue of
open Wi-Fi networks are Sections 1030(a)(2) and 1030(a)(5)(A).
Section 1030(a)(2) creates liability for whoever "(2) intentionally
accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and
thereby obtains ... (C) information from any protected computer if the
conduct involved an interstate or foreign communication. '58 Section
1030(a)(5)(A)(iii) criminalizes whoever "intentionally accesses a protected
computer without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, causes
damage. 59 These provisions present two threshold questions 60 : (1) did the
user's conduct constitute intentional, unauthorized access, and (2) did the
user's conduct result in information sharing sufficient to satisfy the terms of
section 1030(a)(2)(C) or damage sufficient to satisfy the terms of Section
1030(a)(5)(A)(iii)?
56 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(2)(A), 1030(a)(3), 1030(a)(5)(A)(i) (2000 & Supp. II
2002).
57 See §§ 1030(a)(2), 1030(a)(5)(A).
58 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2).
59 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(iii). This statute in its entirety holds accountable
whomever:
(5) (A) (i) knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or
command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without
authorization, to a protected computer;
(ii) intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a result
of such conduct, recklessly causes damage; or
(iii) intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a
result of such conduct, causes damage; and
(B) by conduct described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) of subparagraph (A), caused (or,
in the case of an attempted offense, would, if completed, have caused)-(i) loss to I
or more persons during any i-year period (and, for purposes of an investigation,
prosecution, or other proceeding brought by the United States only, loss resulting
from a related course of conduct affecting 1 or more other protected computers)
aggregating at least $ 5, 000 in value ....
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5) (emphasis added). Sections 1030(a)(5)(i) and (ii) focus more
on conduct akin to hacking rather than joyriding.
60 The question of whether a Wi-Fi network constitutes a protected computer
appears unlikely to arise. As presently interpreted, the CFAA encompasses conduct on
the Internet, which indicates that accessing a Wi-Fi network constitutes conduct within
the limits of the statute. See infra note 61 (defining "computer").
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A. Intentional, Unauthorized Access
The CFAA requires that a user engage in intentional, unauthorized
access before liability can attach to the user's conduct. This breaks down into
two lines of analysis: whether users have the requisite criminal intent and
whether users engage in unauthorized access.
Users must have the requisite mens rea to be culpable under the CFAA.
Sections 1030(a)(2) and 1030(a)(5)(A)(iii) require that users intentionally
access a computer 61 without authorization. 62 It is unclear whether the
intentionality language applies solely to the word "access" or if it extends to
encompass the whole phrase "access a computer without authorization."
63
What is clear is that the mens rea applies only to one of these phrases; the
intentional mens rea does not apply to the damages language of the statute.64
Users must engage in unauthorized access to be liable for an offense
under the CFAA.65 Unfortunately, the CFAA leaves this phrase undefined.
66
61 For the purposes of the CFAA, computer is defined as
an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing
device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage fimctions, and includes any data
storage facility or communications facility directly related to or operating in
conjunction with such device, but such term does not include an automated
typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other similar device.
18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1). Although this provision does not expressly include the term
"network," in United States v. Morris, the Second Circuit found that releasing an Internet
worm into the Internet--"a national computer network"-falls within the range of
conduct regulated by section 1030(a)(5)(A). United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 505
(2d Cir. 1991); see also Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital
Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REv. 439, 475-76 (2003).
62 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(2), 1030(a)(5)(A)(iii) (emphasis added). Section 1030(a)(2)
differs moderately, attributing the intentional mens rea not only to access without
authorization but also to access that "exceeds authorized access." § 1030(a)(2). The
CFAA also requires particular mens rea with regard to damages. Sections 1030(a)(2),
1030(a)(5)(A)(ii), and 1030(a)(5)(A)(iii) all require a user to intentionally access a
network. §§ 1030(a)(2), 1030(a)(5)(A)(ii), 1030(a)(5)(A)(iii) (emphasis added). Section
1030(a)(5)(A)(ii) further requires that the user recklessly cause damage.
§ 1030(a)(5)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). Section 1030(a)(5)(A)(i) requires that the user
intentionally cause damage. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(i). Although Section 1030(a)(5)(A)(iii)
contains a damage requirement, it applies with strict liability and has no requisite mens
rea. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(iii).
63 See infra notes 133-35 (discussing the mens rea requirement of the CFAA).
64 Id.
65 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(2), 1030(a)(5)(A).
66 It does define "exceeds authorized access," holding the term to mean "to access a
computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the
computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter .. " 18 U.S.C.
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Courts have considered the meaning of unauthorized access in a variety of
different ways: evaluating the means or purpose of access, looking for a
violation of the terms of service governing access, or finding a violation of
the express or presumptive terms of access to a website. 67
B. Information Sharing and Damages
In addition to intentional, unauthorized access, the CFAA requires a user
to engage in information sharing and/or cause damage to be subject to
liability.68 Section 1030(a)(2)(C) requires that a user obtain "information
from any protected computer if the conduct involved an interstate of foreign
communication." 69 The CFAA leaves "information" undefined.70 While
courts have not explicitly addressed what constitutes information, the issue
has arisen in a variety of different contexts. 71
While section 1030(a)(2)(C) focuses on information, section
1030(a)(5)(A) focuses on damage. Users must cause damage to be subject to
liability under a section 1030(a)(5)(A) claim. Section 1030(a)(5)(A)(iii)
specifically requires users to cause damage,72 defined as "any impairment to
the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information." 73
The damage requirement set forth in this provision compels the court to
make individual and aggregate assessments of the loss caused by the
unauthorized access. 74
Section 1030(a)(5)(B) requires that the damage stemming from the
unauthorized access cause loss in excess of a statutorily defined minimum.
§ 1030(e)(6); see also Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope: Interpreting "Access" and
"Authorization " in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1596, 1632-37 (2003).
67 See infra Part VI.A. 1.
68 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(2)(C), 1030(a)(5)(A).
69 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C). Also, in order to bring a civil claim, a plaintiff must
additionally show loss or damage as a result of a violation of this provision. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(g); see also In re Intuit Privacy Litigation, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1280-81 (C.D.
Cal. 2001) (addressing whether plaintiff must suffer economic damages under section
1030(g) in order to bring a civil claim).
70 Looking at the legislative history, Congress stated that the "premise of 18 U.S.C.
1030(a)(2) will remain the protection, for privacy reasons, of computerized credit records
and computerized information relating to customers' relationship with financial
institutions." S. REP. 99-432, at 6 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2484.
Congress later reiterated that the purpose of this section is "privacy protection." Id.
71 See infra Part VI.A.1.
72 In contrast to sections 1030(a)(5)(A)(i) and (ii), which require users to
intentionally or recklessly cause damage, subsection (iii) only requires that users cause
damage, with no attached mens rea.
73 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8).
74 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B)(i).
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Although section 1030(a)(5)(B) sets forth five criteria, one or more of which
must be met for the user's section 1030(a)(5)(A) conduct to be actionable,
the monetary loss requirement is most germane to the WLAN context. The
statute states that in addition to committing an act within the scope of section
1030(a)(5)(B), a user must have "caused ... (i) loss to 1 or more persons
during any 1-year period ... aggregating at least $5,000 in value. '75 The
CFAA goes on to define "loss" as "any reasonable cost to any victim,
including the cost of responding to an offense, conducting a damage
assessment, and restoring the data, program, system, or information to its
condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other
consequential damages incurred because of interruption of service." 76 Courts
have varied in interpreting loss, specifically with regard to whether the
definition includes economic loss.77
The CFAA constitutes but one means by which open wireless access
may run afoul of the law. In addition to federal law, state laws could prove
relevant to open Wi-Fi access.
IV. STATE STATUTORY LAW
All fifty states have enacted legislation that may impact users' access to
open wireless networks. 78 These statutes vary widely in name, including:
75 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B). The statute goes on to list other prohibited effects of
section 1030(a)(5)(A) conduct, including, among others, physical injury and a threat to
public health or safety, but the monetary provision is most pertinent for the purposes of
this Note.
76 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1 1).
77 See infra notes 155-63 and accompanying text.
78 ALA. CODE § 13A-8-103 (LexisNexis 2004); ALASKA STAT. §11.46.740 (2004);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2316 (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-41-104, 5-41-203
(2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 502 (West 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-5.5-102
(West 2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-251 (West 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 932 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 815.06 (West 2006); GA. CODE. ANN. § 16-9-93 (2003);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-895.7 (Supp. 2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-2202 (2004); 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16D-3 (West 2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-2-3 (West 2005);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 716.6B (West Supp. 2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3755 (Supp.
2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 434.850, 434.851, 434.853 (LexisNexis Supp. 2005); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:73.4 (1999), 14:73.7 (Supp. 2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-
A, § 432 (2006); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 7-302 (LexisNexis 2002); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 266, § 120F (LexisNexis Supp. 2006); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.795
(West 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.891 (West Supp. 2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-
45-5 (West 1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 569.099 (West Supp. 2006); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 45-6-311 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1344.01 (LexisNexis 2003); NEV. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 205.4765 (LexisNexis 2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 638:17 (Supp.
2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:38A-3 (West 2000); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-45-5 (LexisNexis
2004); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 156.05 (McKinney 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-454 (2005);
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computer trespass, unauthorized use, computer tampering, computer crime,
criminal use of a computer, offenses against computer users, and criminal
invasion of computer privacy.79 The content of these statutes reflects the
diversity of their names. State statutes vary with regard to the mens rea and
scope of the offense. States define access and authorization differently, or in
some cases, not at all.80 Additionally, some statutes require that an offender
commit harm or cause damage while others provide affirmative defenses to
the conduct engaged in by the accused.81 Sorting through the components of
these statutes reveals differences that may impact the viability of an
unauthorized access claim.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-08 (2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.04 (West Supp.
2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1953 (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.377 (2005);
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7611 (West Supp. 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52-3 (2002);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-16-20 (Supp. 2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-43B-1 (2004);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-602 (2003); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.02 (Vernon 2001);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-703 (Supp. 2006); VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 13, § 4102 (Supp. 2005);
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.6 (Supp. 2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.52.120 (West
2000); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3C-5 (LexisNexis 2005); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.70
(West 2005); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-504 (2005); see also Susan W. Brenner, State
Cybercrime Legislation in the United States of America: A Survey, RICH. J.L. & TECH.,
ISSUE 3, WINTER 2001, at 8-9 (2001), http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v7i3/article2.html.
While this Part focuses on criminal liability, several states have expressly empowered
victims of crimes of this nature to bring a civil action to recover damages. See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 502(e)(1) (West 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 815.06(4)(a) (West 2006); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-9-93(g) (2003); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16D-3(b)(6) (2003); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 716.6B(2) (West Supp. 2006); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.525(1) (West 2000);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:38A-3 (West 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-08(3) (2005);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1955 (West 2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-16-25 (Supp. 2005);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-604(a) (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4106 (Supp. 2005);
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.12(A) (Supp. 2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3C-16(a)
(LexisNexis 2005).
79 See supra note 78. In addition to statutes that regulate unauthorized access,
statutes that target theft of services may also prove relevant to the issue of open Wi-Fi
access. While unauthorized access or computer trespass statutes focus more on the means
of access, theft of services statutes typically mandate a purpose of obtaining unauthorized
computer services. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 638:17(11) (Supp. 2005) ("A person
is guilty of the computer crime of theft of computer services when he or she knowingly
accesses or causes to be accessed or otherwise uses or causes to be used a computer or
computer network with the purpose of obtaining unauthorized computer services.").
80 See infra Part IV.B.
81 See infra Part IV.C.
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A. Mens Rea
State statutes make use of differing mens rea terminology and vary the
terms to which the mens rea applies. Statutes use the terms knowingly, 82
purposely, 83 willfully, 84 intentionally, 85 or a combination 86 to specify the
82 Examples include Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5.5-102 (2005) ("knowingly
[a]ccesses"); New York, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 156.05 (McKinney 1999) ("knowingly
uses"); and Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.04(B) (West Supp. 2006) ("knowingly
gain access to"). The majority of states make use of some variant of the "knowingly"
mens rea. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.740 (2004); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2316
(2001); CAL. PENAL CODE § 502 (West 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5.5-102; CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-251 (West 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 932 (2001); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 815.06 (West 2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-93 (2003); RAW. REv. STAT.
§ 708-895.7 (Supp. 2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-2202 (2004); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/16D-3 (West 2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-2-3 (West 2004); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 716.6B (West Supp. 2006); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 434.850, 434.851, 434.853
(LexisNexis Supp. 2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:73.7 (Supp. 2006); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17-A, § 433 (2006); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 569.099 (West Supp. 2006); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-6-311 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1344 (LexisNexis 2003);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.4765 (LexisNexis 2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 638:17
(Supp. 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:38A-3 (West 2000); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-45-5
(LexisNexis 2004); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 156.05; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.04; OR.
REV. STAT. § 164.377 (2005); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-16-20 (Supp. 2005); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 43-43B-1 (2004); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.02 (Vernon 2001); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 4102 (Supp. 2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3C-5 (LexisNexis 2005);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-504 (2005).
83 Montana requires an offender to engage in conduct "knowingly or purposely."
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-311 (1) (2005). New Jersey also states a mens rea of
"purposeful or knowing." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:38A-3 (West 2000).
84 North Carolina requires an offender to engage in access "willfully," N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-454 (2005), as do Alabama, ALA. CODE § 13A-8-103 (LexisNexis 2005),
Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1953 (West 2002), and Virginia, VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-152.6 (Supp. 2005).
85 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-41-104 (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3755(d) (Supp.
2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.795 (West 2004); MINN. STAT ANN. § 609.891
(West Supp. 2006), MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-45-5 (West 1999); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 28-1344 (LexisNexis 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-08(2) (2005); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 761 l(a)(2) (West Supp. 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52-3 (2002); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-14-602(b) (2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.52.120(l) (West
2000).
86 Florida requires an offender to engage in accesses "willfully, knowingly, and
without authorization." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 815.06 (West 2006). Maryland states a mens
rea of intentionally and willfully. MD. CODE ANN., CRiM. LAW § 7-302(c)(1) (LexisNexis
2002). Other states provide options, such as Indiana's mens rea requirement of
"knowingly or intentionally," IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-2-3(b) (West 2004), or New
Jersey's requirement of "purposeful or knowing." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:38A-3(c) (West
2000); see also supra note 84.
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mens rea of the delineated offense. Additionally, the state of Utah appears to
have eschewed a mens rea requirement and made unauthorized access a strict
liability offense. 87 The differing mens rea in and of themselves are not
particularly compelling; these terms encompass roughly the same category of
conduct. 88 More importantly, states apply these mens rea in different ways.
States vary in how they apply the mens rea within a statute, most
pertinently with regard to the terms access and authorization. Most states
apply the mens rea to the access phrase with a lack of authorization being
another element of the offense. 89 A typical statute in these jurisdictions
87 Utah's statute penalizes "[a] person who without authorization gains or attempts
to gain access to ... any.., computer network ... and thereby ... obtains ... a benefit
for any person without [a] legal right." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-703(1) (Supp. 2006).
88 While states provide specific definitions for culpable mental states within their
codes, for the sake of expediency, consider the statutes' mens rea in light of the Model
Penal Code. The Model Penal Code provides the following definitions:
(a) Purposely.
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his
conscious object to engage in cond'uct of that nature or to cause such a result;
and
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the
existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.
(b) Knowingly.
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant
circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such
circumstances exist;
and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is
practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (1962) (emphasis added). The distinction between these
two mental states is functionally irrelevant because both states that make use of the
"purposely" mens rea use it alternatively with knowingly. See supra note 84. The Model
Penal Code goes on to state that "[a] requirement that an offense be committed wilfully
[sic] is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with respect to the material elements of the
offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements appears." § 2.02(8). Thus, those
states that employ a "willful" mens rea, see supra note 84, could be viewed as using a
"knowing" mens rea. Lastly, the code provides that "'intentionally' or 'with intent'
means purposely." § 1.13(12). So, the eleven states that use the "intentional" mens rea,
see supra note 85, essentially are using a "purposeful" mens rea. Given the
aforementioned, in a Model Penal Code world, the only practical difference in culpability
would be between the eleven states that employ the "intentional" (i.e., purposeful) mens
rea; the remaining thirty-nine states essentially all require a culpable mental state of
"knowing."
89 ALA. CODE § 13A-8-103 (LexisNexis 2005); ALASKA STAT. §11.46.740 (2005);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2316 (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-41-104, 5-41-203
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would prohibit an offender from knowingly and without authorization
accessing a computer network.90 Other states take the opposite approach,
applying the mens rea to authorization, with access constituting another
element of the offense.91 In these states, statutes prohibit a person from
accessing a network and provide that the person must know his or her access
is not authorized.92 Lastly, some statutes apply the mens rea to both access
and authorization, 93 with a representative statute requiring a person to both
knowingly access a network and know that his or her access is not
authorized.94 These variances constitute more than semantic differences. A
(2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 502 (West 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5.5-102 (2005);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 815.06 (West 2006); HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-895.7 (Supp. 2005);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-2202 (2004); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16D-3 (West 2003);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-2-3 (West 2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 716.6B (West Supp.
2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3755(d) (Supp. 2005); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 434.850,
434.851, 434.853 (LexisNexis Supp. 2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:73.4 (1999),
14:73.7 (Supp. 2006); MD. CODE ANN., CRAM. LAW § 7-302 (LexisNexis 2002); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 266, § 120F (LexisNexis Supp. 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 752.795 (West 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.891 (West Supp. 2006); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 97-45-5 (West 1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 569.099 (West Supp. 2006); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-6-311 (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.4765 (LexisNexis 2006);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:38A-3 (West 2000); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-45-5 (LexisNexis 2004);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 156.05 (McKinney 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-454 (2005); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-08(2) (2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.04(B) (West Supp.
2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1953 (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.377 (2005);
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7611 (West Supp. 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52-3 (2002);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-16-20 (Supp. 2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-43B-1 (2004);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-602(b) (2003); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.02 (Vernon
2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-703 (Supp. 2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4102 (Supp.
2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.6 (Supp. 2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.52.120
(2000); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3C-5 (LexisNexis 2005); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.70
(West 2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-504 (2005).
90 See, e.g., Florida's statute delineating offenses against computer users, which
states: "Whoever willfully, knowingly, and without authorization ... accesses or causes
to be accessed any ... computer network...." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 815.06(1)(a) (West
2006).
91 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-25 1(b) (West 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 932
(2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-93 (2003).
92 See, e.g., Delaware's statute, holding that a person is guilty of unauthorized
access when, "knowing that the person is not authorized to do so, the person accesses ...
any computer system without authorization." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 932 (2001).
93 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 432 (2006); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1344
(LexisNexis 2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 638:17 (Supp. 2005).
94 See, e.g., New Hampshire's statute criminalizing conduct when, "knowing that
the person is not authorized to do so, he or she knowingly accesses ... any.., computer
network without authorization." N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 638:17(I) (Supp. 2005).
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state's particular application of mens rea has implications for the viability of
a claim of unauthorized access regarding open wireless networks.95
B. Access and Authorization
The majority of states define the term "access" by statute,96 typically
referencing interaction with a computer network. 97 Although states define
"access" similarly, courts' interpretations are anything but-contradictory
precedent exists regarding the scope of "access." 98
95 See infra Part VI.B.
96 ALA. CODE § 13A-8-101(11) (LexisNexis 2005); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
2301(E)(1) (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-41-102(1) (2006); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 502(b)(1) (West 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5.5-101(10) (2005) (defining "use");
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-250(1) (West 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 931(1)
(2001); FLA. STAT. § 815.02(1) (2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-92(16) (Supp. 2006)
(defining "use"); HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-890 (Supp. 2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-
2201(l) (2004); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16D-2(e) (West 2003); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-43-2-3(a) (West 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3755(a)(1) (Supp. 2005); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 434.840(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:73.1(1)
(Supp. 2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 431(1) (2006); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
LAW § 7-302(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.792 Sec. 2(1)
(West 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.87 Subd. 2 (West 2003); MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-
45-1(a) (West 2005); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-310 (2005) (defining "obtain the use
of'); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1343(1) (LexisNexis 2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 205.4732 (LexisNexis 2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 638:16(1) (Supp. 2005); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-23(a) (West 2005); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-45-2(A) (LexisNexis
2004); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 156.00(6) (McKinney 1999) (defining "uses a computer or
computer service without authorization"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-453(1) (2005); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-01(3)(a) (2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.01(T) (West
Supp. 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1952(1) (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 164.377(1)(a) (2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52-1(1) (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-16-
10(i) (Supp. 2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-43B-2(1) (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-
14-601(1) (2003); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.01(1) (Vernon 2001); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-6-702(1) (Supp. 2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4101(1) (Supp. 2005); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-152.2 (Supp. 2005) (defining "uses"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.52.010(6) (West Supp. 2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3C-3(a) (LexisNexis 2005);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.70(1) (West 2005); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-50 1(a)(i) (2005).
97 See, e.g., Florida, which defines access as "to approach, instruct, communicate
with, store data in, retrieve data from, or otherwise make use of any resources of a
computer, computer system, or computer network." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 815.03(1) (West
2006).
9 8 See infra Part VI.B. 1.
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In contrast to access, few states define what constitutes authorization. 99
The states that do provide definitions vary in the scope of conduct
encompassed by the term. Some states define authorization as requiring the
express consent of the owner. 100 Other states base the definition on a
reasonableness standard l1 or implied consent.1 0 2 Still other states define
authorization generically in terms of consent or permission. 10 3 Unfortunately,
state case law does little to illuminate the meaning of authorization. The few
state cases that have addressed authorization have arisen primarily in the
context of employee misconduct.1° 4 In some states, the determination of
99 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5.5-101(1) (2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-92(18) (Supp.
2006); HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-890 (Supp. 2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§ 431(11) (2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.87 Subd. 2a (West 2003); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 638:16(11) (Supp. 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-23(q) (2005); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-453(la) (2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52-1(15)(v) (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-16-
10(1) (Supp. 2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-601(2) (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-
702(2) (2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.2 (Supp. 2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3C-
3(b) (LexisNexis 2005). In the absence of a definition, at least one court has turned to
Black's Law Dictionary and Webster's Dictionary for guidance. See Briggs v. State, 704
A.2d 904, 909 (Md. 1998).
100 See, e.g., Colorado, which defines authorization as "the express consent of a
person ... to use said person's ... computer network." COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5.5-
101(1) (2005).
101 While New Jersey defines authorization as permission, authority, or consent, the
statute goes on to provide that "[a]n actor has authorization if a reasonable person would
believe that the act was authorized." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-23(q) (West 2005).
102 See, e.g., South Carolina, which provides that "'[u]nauthorized access' means
access of a .. . computer network not explicitly or implicitly authorized by the
appropriate principal." S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-16-10(1) (Supp. 2005). Tennessee provides
perhaps the broadest definition, stating that "' [a]uthorization' means any and all forms of
consent, including both implicit and explicit consent." TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-601(2)
(Supp. 2005).
103 See, e.g., Maine, which states that "'unauthorized' mean[s] not having consent or
permission of the owner." ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 431(11) (2006). These
definitions offer little clarity to the meaning of authorization, as they turn on the
interpretations of permission and consent which are themselves undefined terms.
Minnesota provides an exception to this vagary; while the statute defines authorization as
permission, it goes on to state that "[a]uthorization may be limited by the owner by: (1)
giving the user actual notice orally or in writing; (2) posting a written notice in a
prominent location adjacent to the computer being used; or (3) using a notice displayed
on or announced by the computer being used." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.87 Subd. 2a
(West 2003). The last two options illustrate the conundrum presented by Wi-Fi: wireless
networking changes the location dynamic such that posting or displaying a notice by a
computer becomes impractical.
104 See Fugarino v. State, 531 S.E.2d 187, 189 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (finding that
Fugarino lacked the authority to delete portions of a company's computer program, as
indicated by the testimony of the company's owner that no such permission was granted
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unauthorized access ends the inquiry-liability attaches upon satisfaction of
these terms. However, many states require damages for users to be culpable
under state law.
C. Harm and Damages
In accord with the different statutory structures aforementioned, states
vary in the manner in which they treat harm and damages. Some states
predicate users' liability on whether some other harm occurs in addition to
the unauthorized access. While the vast majority of states reject basing
liability on an additional element, many states vary the offense level in
connection with the amount of damage caused by the unauthorized access.
A handful of states criminalize unauthorized access only if accompanied
by some harm being caused as a result of the access. For instance, Alaska
requires that in addition to engaging in unauthorized access, an offender
must, at a minimum, "obtain[] information concerning a person." 10 5 Under
Georgia's computer trespass statute, an offender must not only use a
computer without authority, but use the computer with the "intention of...
[a]ltering, damaging, or in any way causing the malfunction of a ...
computer network."' 106 The conduct criminalized by these statutes is
comparable to higher level offenses in most other states, 107 but here
and by the "vindictive and retaliatory manner" of Fugarino's conduct); State v. Olson,
735 P.2d 1362, 1365-66 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (explaining that police officer's access of
police database for personal use was not without authority; permission to use the database
was not predicated on the uses made of the data, thus while against departmental policy,
police officer still had authority to access); Briggs v. State, 704 A.2d 904, 909-10 (Md.
1998) (stating that system administrator had authority to access computer, thus while his
conduct was inappropriate, he had the authority to engage in it because the Maryland
statute prohibits only unauthorized access, not access outside the scope of authority); see
also Kerr, supra note 66, at 1596, 1632-37.
105 ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.740(a)(1) (2004).
106 GA. CODE. ANN. § 16-9-93(b) (2003). Although the statute requires the offender
to engage in some form of harm, the harm may be only for a brief moment. Id. (stating
that the requirement of alteration, damage, or malfunction applies "regardless of how
long the alteration, damage, or malfunction persists"). It seems that momentary
interference by a wireless user may be sufficient conduct to fall within the scope of the
statute. North Carolina's statute addresses conduct in an even more vague manner. The
statute prohibits unlawful access for purposes of fraud or obtaining property, but goes on
to prohibit unauthorized access for any purpose as a lesser offense. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
454 (2005). This would appear to require a purpose behind the unauthorized access, but
the extent of this purpose is unclear.
107 For instance, in Hawaii, obtaining personal information, as per the Alaska
statute, would raise the level of unauthorized access offense from a third degree
misdemeanor to a class C felony. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 708-895.6, 708-895.7 (Supp.
2005).
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represents the minimum conduct required for an offender to face conviction
for unauthorized access. While only a few states require a minimum level of
additional harm, several tie the level of the offense to the monetary amount
of damage caused.
Conviction for unauthorized access ranges from a misdemeanor to a
felony offense, with some states varying the offense level in proportion to the
amount of damage caused by the offender. For example, Delaware delineates
five degrees of unauthorized access. 108 The highest level of offense is a class
D felony and applies "when the damage to or the value of the property or
computer services affected exceeds $10,000."109 The lowest level offense, a
class A misdemeanor, applies where the damage or value of the property at
issue is $500 or less. 1 0 In some instances, no damage may be required and
no unauthorized access need occur-fourteen states prohibit attempted
unauthorized access. Il In the event that users engage in unauthorized access
in violation of state law, some states provide defenses or other means that
may absolve users' conduct.
D. Affirmative Conduct, Defenses, and Exceptions
Although nearly all states focus on the conduct of the offender in
unauthorized access statutes, the State of New York imposes an affirmative
conduct requirement on network operators. New York's unauthorized use
statute prohibits the knowing use of a computer service without
authorization. 112 However, the statute only applies where the accessed
computer "is equipped or programmed with any device or coding system, a
function of which is to prevent the unauthorized use of said computer or
computer system." 113 Unless owners or operators protect their computer
networks, the statute does not apply.114 New York represents the extreme by
essentially imposing requirements on network operators, but a number of
states offer avenues for users to avoid liability.
108 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 939 (2001).
109 § 939(a).
110 § 939(e).
I II See, e.g., Ohio, which criminalizes an offender who "knowingly attempt[s] to
gain access to... [a] computer network... without. . . consent." OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2913.04(B) (West Supp. 2006).
112 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 156.05 (McKinney 1999).
113 Id.
114 Similarly, Nebraska and Minnesota both have unauthorized access statutes that
require that an offender "penetrate[] a computer security system." NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 28-1343.01(1) (LexisNexis 2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.891 Subd. 1 (West Supp.
2006).
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Several states provide other affirmative defenses and exceptions to
unauthorized access offenses. Many of these are grounded in reasonableness.
In some states, offenders may escape culpability for an offense by showing
that they had reasonable grounds to believe that their access was
authorized"15 or could not have reasonably known that their access was
unauthorized. 116 Other states have provided affirmative defenses protecting
employee conduct1 7 and acts that further computer security.18
While criminalizing unauthorized access, many of the previously
mentioned federal and state laws provide for civil liability as well. But in the
context of civil liability, the common law may prove a pertinent doctrine to
addressing joyriding conduct.
V. COMMON LAW: TRESPASS TO CHATTELS
Courts may construe the common law doctrine of trespass to chattels in a
manner that includes civil liability for users that connect to open Wi-Fi
networks. 119 The doctrine of trespass to chattels protects an individual's
property from the use of others. The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines
the doctrine, stating that "[a] trespass to a chattel may be committed by
intentionally (a) dispossessing another of the chattel, or (b) using or
intermeddling with a chattel in the possession of another."' 120 An individual
will only be liable to the possessor of the chattel if:
15 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.477(4) (LexisNexis 2006) ("It is an
affirmative defense ... that at the time of the alleged offense the defendant reasonably
believed that... [h]e was authorized to use or access the ... network.").
116See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §53a-251(b)(2)(C) (2001) ("It shall be an
affirmative defense to a prosecution for unauthorized access to a computer system that
... the person reasonably could not have known that his access was unauthorized.").
117 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 815.06(6) (2006) ("This section does not apply to any
person who accesses his or her employer's.., computer network... when acting within
the scope of his or her lawful employment.").
118 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-703(5) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006) ("It is an
affirmative defense ... that a person obtained access ... in response to, and for the
purpose of protecting against or investigating, a prior attempted or successful breach of
security.").
119 See Hale, supra note 35, at 552; Kern, supra note 41, at 152. The law of
contracts provides another important dynamic to both the statutory and common law
provisions. Internet service providers ("ISPs") contract with consumers to provide
services. These contracts may impact the interpretation of authorization and in turn
impact whether conduct comports with or violates the law. See Kerr, supra note 66, at
1637-40.
120 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 (1965).
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(a) he dispossesses the other of the chattel, or (b) the chattel is impaired
as to its condition, quality, or value, or (c) the possessor is deprived of the
use of the chattel for a substantial time, or (d) bodily harm is caused to the
possessor, or harm is caused to some person or thing in which the possessor
has a legally protected interest.121
Courts have interpreted these criteria in varying ways, and in some
instances have found that open Wi-Fi access amounts to conduct
contemplated by the Restatement. 1 22
Traditionally, trespass to chattels required physical touching or entry to
constitute an actionable tort. 123 However, courts have applied the doctrine of
trespass to chattels to electronic communications, creating what may be
termed electronic or digital trespass. 124 Even if courts extend the doctrine to
cover electronic conduct, damages remain a pressing concern. Damages
considerations represent an important threshold issue in a court's application
of trespass to chattels to Internet-related conduct. While courts may issue an
injunction premised merely on the trespass, for the doctrine to be actionable,
a plaintiff must demonstrate damage. 125
Several defenses to trespass to chattels exist, but most relevant is the
doctrine of apparent consent, which may insulate users from liability for
open wireless access. According to the Restatement, "[i]f words or conduct
are reasonably understood by another to be intended as consent, they
constitute apparent consent and are as effective as consent in fact."'126 In the
context of wireless access, apparent consent could be inferred from leaving a
wireless network unsecured.
121 Id. at § 218.
122 See infra Part VI.C.
123 See Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 473 n.6 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996). This reflects the physical nature of a chattel, defined by Black's Law Dictionary as
"[m]ovable or transferable property; personal property; esp., a physical object capable of
manual delivery and not the subject matter of real property." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
251 (8th ed. 2004).
124 Thrifty-Tel, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473 n.6 ("In our view, the electronic signals
generated by the Bezenek boys' activities were sufficiently tangible to support a trespass
cause of action."); see also White Buffalo Ventures L.L.C. v. Univ. of Texas, 420 F.3d
366, 377 n.24 (5th Cir. 2005).
125 See infra Part VI.C.
126 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892(2) (1965).
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VI. THE APPLICABILITY OF STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW TO OPEN
WIRELESS ACCESS
While prosecutors charged Benjamin Smith solely under Florida law, his
case raises the bigger question pertinent to all Wi-Fi joyriders: is accessing
an open wireless network legal? While a court can issue an injunction based
on electronic trespass conduct, a plaintiff must demonstrate damage from the
conduct in order to bring a colorable trespass to chattels action. In the federal
context, if courts broadly construe the terms "access" and "authorization,"
and liberally interpret the type and amount of damages permissible by
statute, an individual may be liable for unauthorized access conduct. The
same applies for state statutes constructed and interpreted similarly to the
CFAA. However, differing state statutes lead to varying results. Liability
attaches more easily in states with a minimal or no damage requirement. In
contrast, liability is unlikely in states such as New York, which requires users
to circumvent security for their conduct to be actionable. 127 Turning to the
common law, user liability under the trespass to chattels doctrine depends on
a court's willingness to extend the doctrine to encompass unauthorized
access conduct.
A. The CFAA
Distinguishing between intentional, unauthorized access and authorized
access is paramount in the context of determining liability for users' access
to open Wi-Fi networks. The nature of Wi-Fi makes this determination a
challenge. The CFAA originally addressed technology that significantly
differs from Wi-Fi technology.' 28 Given this difference, the language of the
statute and precedent regarding authorization and access are unclear as
applied to wireless networks.
127 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 156.05 (McKinney 1999).
128 The CFAA targeted technology that differs significantly from the wireless
technology utilized today. Congress enacted the CFAA in 1984, significantly amending it
in 1986 and 1994. In the mid-1980s, networks did not provide broad public access, but
were instead private. See Kern, supra note 41, at 123. A user would need to physically
enter a computing facility and access the network while on-site. As technology evolved,
so did the means of access. In the late-1980s and through the 1990s, the Internet
blossomed into a widely-used publicly accessible network. This development changed
the access dynamic. Network access no longer required physical entry to a computing
facility; a user could freely access the network from his or her home or business via dial-
up, and later, broadband. Thus, while users were still tied to a physical location (the point
of access created by the landline), the network, the Internet became widely available for
public use. Wi-Fi networking represents the next evolution in the networking dynamic by
allowing for less physically restricted access to the Internet.
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1. Case Interpretation
Cases interpreting the CFAA reflect the difficulties brought on by the
changing dynamic of network access. Some courts have examined the
legislative history and text of the original CFAA to create a distinction
between "insiders" and "outsiders."' 129 Under this distinction, provisions of
the CFAA 'are intended to apply to outsiders who access a computer,' not
to 'insiders' who access individuals' computers with their permission to do
so." 130 However, other courts have cited the legislative history of the 1996
amendments to the CFAA to support the proposition that the insider/outsider
distinction no longer exists. 131 This initial distinction creates confusion about
the exact scope and applicability of the act as a whole. Further complicating
matters are the courts' varying interpretations of the mens rea requirement, of
what constitutes intentional unauthorized access, and the nature and measure
of damages.
Courts have attempted to clarify the appropriate application of the
"intentional" mens rea within the provisions of the CFAA. Both Section
1030(a)(2) and 1030(a)(5)(A)(ii) contain the intentional mens rea. In
interpreting these statutes, courts faced the issue of whether this means rea
applied only to the term "access" or if it applied to the term "damages" as
well. In evaluating section 1030(a)(5)(A), the Second Circuit indicated that
the intentionality standard applies to the "accesses" phrase and not to
damages: 132
Despite some isolated language in the legislative history that arguably
suggests a scienter component for the "damages" phrase of section
1030(a)(5)(A), the wording, structure, and purpose of the subsection,
examined in comparison with its departure from the format of its
129 Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Disc., Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1272,
1275 (N.D. Iowa 2000); see also SecureInfo Corp. v. Telos Corp., 387 F. Supp. 2d 593,
609 (E.D. Va. 2005); see also S. Rep. No. 99-432, at 10-11 (1986) reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2488.
130 SecureInfo, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 609, (citing In re Am. Online, Inc., 168 F. Supp.
2d 1359, 1370-71 (S.D. Fla. 2001)). Congress's willingness to draw a bright line
distinction may be attributed to the physical access dynamic prevalent during the time
period in which Congress enacted the original CFAA (as opposed to the current ubiquity
of network and Internet usage). See supra note 128.
131 Shurgard Storage Ctrs. v. Safeguard Self Storage, 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1127
(W.D. Wash. 2000) ("Though the original scope of the CFAA was limited to ['outsiders'
or 'hackers,' and not 'insiders' (employees)], its subsequent amendments have broadened
the scope."); see also Am. Online, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 1371 (specifically rejecting the
insider/outsider distinction in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) (2000 & Supp. III
2003)); Kern, supra note 41, at 122-23.
132 United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 509 (2d Cir. 1991).
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predecessor provision persuade us that the "intentionally" standard applies
only to the "accesses" phrase of section 1030(a)(5)(A), and not to its
"damages" phrase.133
Because the Morris court used the word "phrase," as opposed to "term"
or "word," it appears to indicate that the intentional mens rea may extend to
cover the whole of the "accesses a protected computer without authorization"
phrase. Courts have not explicitly addressed this matter of statutory
interpretation, but a few cases have indicated that the intentional mens rea
applies only to the word "access." 134 The bigger interpretive issue falls on
the courts' views of access and authorization.
Liability for an offense under the CFAA rests in part on an undefined
term: unauthorized access. 135 In considering access, one court turned to the
dictionary to define the act of accessing as "exercis[ing] the 'freedom or
133 Morris, 928 F.2d at 509 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Sablan, 92
F.3d 865, 868 (9th Cir. 1996); Letscher v. Swiss Bank Corp., No. 94 Civ. 8277, 1997 WL
304895, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1997).
134 The Sablan court expressly adopted the language of Morris. Sablan, 92 F.3d at
868. However, it is unclear whether the court intended to use Morris merely to disallow
application of the "intentional" mens rea to the damages provision or to extend the intent
mens rea to encompass the whole "accesses" phrase. At one point the court states that
"Sablan must have had a wrongful intent in accessing the computer in order to be
convicted under the statute." Sablan, 92 F.3d at 869. This does not include the "without
authorization" phrase, and may be indicative of the court's desire to limit the wrongful
intent requirement only to "access." Sablan, 92 F.3d at 868 n.69; see also Letscher, 1997
WL 304895, at *5 ("As the Second Circuit has indicated, a claim under this section
requires proof of intentional acts of unauthorized access-the statute is not designed to
reach 'mistaken, inadvertent, or careless acts of unauthorized access."') (quoting Morris,
928 F.2d at 507).
135 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(2), 1030(a)(5)(A) (2000 & Supp. III 2003); see supra note
66 and accompanying text. Relevant to Section 1030(a)(2), the statute defines computer
as:
an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing
device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data
storage facility or communications facility directly related to or operating in
conjunction with such device, but such term does not include an automated
typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other similar device.
18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1) (2000). Pertinent to section 1030(a)(5)(A), the CFAA definition
for a protected computer includes a computer "which is used in interstate or foreign
commerce or communication, including a computer located outside the United States that
is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the
United States." § 1030(e)(2)(B).
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ability to ... make use of something." 136 Once the National Health Care
Discount court extrapolated that access under the CFAA, it encompassed a
broad range of conduct, reaching so far as to include emails passing through
a computer. 137 Beyond using the dictionary, courts have evaluated
unauthorized access in different ways: referencing the means of access or the
purpose of access, violating the provisions of a "terms of service" agreement,
violating the terms of access to a website, or presumptively violating the
terms of access to a website. 138
Courts have focused on the intended function (i.e., the means or purpose)
of access to determine whether unauthorized access occurs. In Morris, the
defendant was convicted under section 1030(a)(5)(A) for releasing a
computer worm onto the Internet. The court focused on Morris's use of a
network's email capabilities and the ability to learn information about the
users of other computers on the network. In evaluating this conduct, the court
noted that "Morris did not use either the [email or identification features] in
136 Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Disc., Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1273
(N.D. Iowa 2000).
137 Id. ("For purposes of the CFAA, when someone sends an email message from
his or her own computer, and the message then is transmitted through a number of other
computers until it reaches its destination, the sender is making use of all of those
computers, and is therefore 'accessing' them.").
138 See Hale, supra note 35, at 545-46. Kern expands the notion of what qualifies as
unauthorized access by proposing four tests for finding intentional unauthorized access.
See Kern, supra note 41. These are (1) the express authorization test; (2) the subjective
expectations test; (3) the reasonable expectations test; and (4) the express prohibition test.
Kern, supra note 41, at 128-30. He bases the express authorization test on Congress's
statements during enactment of the CFAA noting that the CFAA provisions addressing
unauthorized access apply to "outsiders," while the provisions of the CFAA that apply to
exceeding authorized access apply to insiders. Id. at 128-29. Based on this distinction,
anyone who is not an insider (i.e., having a prior relationship with the network operator)
would lack express authorization and be presumed unauthorized.
The subjective expectations test stems from the decision in Morris. Under the
subjective expectations test, access is "unauthorized if the computer accessed was used in
a way that is not in any way related to its 'intended function."' Id. at 129.
The reasonable expectations test is derived from the district court's decision in EF
Cultural Travel v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2003), see infra note 146 and
accompanying text, and by the implicit analysis under the CFAA. This test first examines
"the reasonable expectations of a network operator in determining whether access is
unauthorized," before turning to an examination of "the reasonable expectations of a user
in determining whether the user intend[ed] to engage in unauthorized access." Id. at 129-
30 (notably, the appellate court in EF Cultural Travel rejected the first component of this
test).
The express prohibition test comes from common law interpretation of trespass to
chattels and from the appellate court in EF Cultural Travel. Under this test, access is
unauthorized only if "a network operator has indicated that access is prohibited, in
website terms of use, by enabling password protection or otherwise." Id. at 130.
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any way related to their intended function.... [I]nstead he found holes in
both programs that permitted him a special and unauthorized access route
into other computers."' 139 Essentially, the purpose of Morris's actions
supported the court's determination that he engaged in unauthorized access.
In Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc.,140 the court found that Verio's use of
automated software process ("robots") to access and collect information from
Register.com's database constituted unauthorized access. 141 The court used
Verio's means of access to justify its finding. 142
Other courts have based the determination of unauthorized access on
evidence of a violation of the terms of service or terms of use. In America
Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc.,143 the court found unauthorized use as a result of
the defendant's violation of AOL's Terms of Service. 144 Defendant LCGM
maintained an AOL membership and used this membership to harvest the
email addresses of other AOL members by means of extractor software
programs. The court succinctly held that "[d]efendants' actions violated
AOL's Terms of Service, and as such was [sic] unauthorized."' 145 At issue in
EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp.14 6 was defendant's use of a "scraper
tool" to skim pricing information from a competing student travel business's
website. 147 The court noted that "[a] lack of authorization could be
established by an explicit statement on the website restricting access,' q 48 thus
giving rise to an unauthorized access cause of action where users of a website
violate the specified terms of use.
139 United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 510 (2d Cir. 1991) (emphasis added).
140 Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004).
141 Id. at 255. The court evaluated the nature of Verio's access under a trespass to
chattels perspective. Id. at 251. Although the court considered the nature of the robot's
conduct, ultimately the court resolved the question of unauthorized access based on
notice; Register.com gave notice (in part by filing the lawsuit) that it objected to Verio's
use of the robots and because of this objection, the robots represent an unauthorized
access. Still, the case illustrates that the means of access are subject to scrutiny in the
court's determination of access. Also of note, the Second Circuit overturned the
preliminary injunction and found it unlikely that Register.com would be able to maintain
its CFAA claim, based on lack of damages. Register.com, 356 F.3d at 439-40. However,
the court upheld the trespass to chattels claim, the root of the district court's unauthorized
access analysis. Id. at 444.
142 Id. at 249-50.
143 Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444 (E.D. Va. 1998).
144 Id. at 450.
145 Id.
146 EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2003).
147 Id. at 60.
148 Id. at 62. The court did register the concern that public policy might limit some
of the restrictions placed on access. Id.
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The EF Cultural Travel court raised the possibility that unauthorized
access may be implicit. As previously stated, a website may restrict access by
explicit statement. But the court went on to state that the "lack of
authorization may be implicit, rather than explicit," further stating that
"[a]fter all, password protection itself normally limits authorization by
implication (and technology), even without express terms." 149 Just as courts
interpret unauthorized access in a variety of ways, the scope of damage and
loss vary between courts.
Courts have considered aspects of information sharing and damages in
the context of the CFAA. Users must share information and/or cause damage
to be liable under Sections 1030(a)(2) and/or 1030(a)(5)(A). Regarding
information sharing, Congress noted that obtaining information in the context
of the CFAA "includes mere observation of the data[.] [A]ctual asportation,
in the sense of physically removing the dat[a] from its original location or
transcribing the data, need not be proved in order to establish a violation of
this subsection."15 0 Minimal case law addresses the specific meaning of the
term "information," but the issue has arisen, inter alia, in the context of
medical information, 151 Internet cookies, 152 academic information, 153 and
financial data. 154 Turning to damages, courts must make determinations of
what exactly damage means and what constitutes loss.
In interpreting damage and loss, courts have interpreted the CFAA so as
to accommodate a variety of network-related conduct. Courts have construed
149 Id. at 63. The court discusses at length the "reasonable expectations" test used by
the district court. Under this test, a lack of authorization can be inferred from the
circumstances. The Second Circuit explicitly rejects this test, and in so doing states:
Our basis for this view is not, as some have urged, that there is a "presumption" of
open access to Internet information. The CFAA, after all, is primarily a statute
imposing limits on access and enhancing control by information providers. Instead,
we think that the public website provider can easily spell out explicitly what is
forbidden and, consonantly, that nothing justifies putting users at the mercy of a
highly imprecise, litigation-spawning standard like "reasonable expectations."
Id. at63.
150 S. REP. No. 104-357, at 7 (1996) (citing S. REP. No. 99-432, at 6-7 (1986)).
151 Doe v. Datmouth-Hitchcock Med. Ctr., No. 00-100-M, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10704, at *8-9 (D. N.H. July 19, 2001); see also Physicians Interactive v. Lathian Sys.
Inc., CA-03-1193-A, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22868, at *15-20 (E.D. Va. Dec 5, 2003).
152 In re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litigation, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 524-25
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).
153 Role Models Am., Inc. v. Jones, 305 F. Supp. 2d 564, 566-68 (D. Md. 2004)
(granting the motion to dismiss the CFAA claim based on lack of unauthorized access).
154 Charles Schwab & Co. v. Carter, et. al., No. 04 C 7071, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21348, at *25-27 (N.D. Il. Sept. 27, 2005).
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the statutory definition of damages' 55 broadly to encompass network
slowdowns and diminished network capacity. 156 The CFAA also defines
loss, 157 but courts vary in their interpretation of the scope of this definition.
Generally, courts have found loss compensable only when it "result[s] from
155 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8) (Supp. III 2003) ("any impairment to the integrity or
availability of data, a program, a system, or information."). The court in America Online,
Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Disc. Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (N.D. Iowa 2000), looked to
the dictionary to determine the meaning of the critical terms of the statutory definition,
defining the terms as follows:
Impairment: something that damages or makes worse by diminishing in some
material respect.
Integrity: Unimpaired, sound, complete, without corruption.
Availability: The state of being present or ready for immediate use; accessible.
Data: Information output that must be processed to be meaningful; information in
numerical form that can be transmitted or processed digitally.
Program: A sequence of coded instructions that can be inserted into a computer,
causing it to perform a particular function.
System: "[A] regularly interacting or interdependent group of items forming a
unified whole ... [such as] a group of devices or artificial objects ... forming a
network...."
Information: Knowledge obtained from investigation, study, or instruction; facts,
data; "a signal or character (as in a communication system or computer) representing
data."
Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Disc., Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1274 (N.D. Iowa
2000) (citations omitted). The court went on to construe the definition as encompassing
slowdowns caused by email spam.
156 Id. at 1274 n.18 (N.D. Iowa 2000) ("[P]hysical damage [is] not restricted to the
physical destruction or harm of computer circuitry but includes loss of access, loss of use,
and loss of functionality.") (quoting American Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Ingram
Micro, Inc., No. 99-185 TUC ACM, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7299, at *6-8 (D. Ariz. Apr.
19, 2000)). The claim in American Guarantee did not arise under the CFAA, but the
National Health Care Discount court still found the interpretation of damages
noteworthy, specifically citing dicta that "[l]awmakers around the country have
determined that when a computer's data is unavailable, there is damage; when a
computer's services are interrupted, there is damage; and when a computer's software or
network is altered, there is damage." Id.
157 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(l 1) (Supp. III 2003) ("any reasonable cost to any victim,
including the cost of responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and
restoring the data, program, system, or information to its condition prior to the offense,
and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of
interruption of service").
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damage to, or the inoperability of, the accessed computer system."1 58 Some
courts have been unwilling to compensate for loss apart from the offending
unauthorized access, such as lost profits, devaluation of database
information, lost business opportunities, or money spent investigating the
violation. 159 However, other courts have used the CFAA's reference to
economic damages160 to construe damages more broadly. 161 The Creative
Computing court went so far as to allow recovery for lost profits and business
goodwill. 162 Regardless of how the term is defined, in considering loss, the
CFAA expressly empowers the court to aggregate the loss a plaintiff suffers
due to the conduct of the offending party to achieve the statutory minimum
of $5,000.163
2. Unauthorized Access Under the CFAA
In light of the statute and precedent, liability for open wireless access
under the CFAA depends on determinations of (1) intent, (2) access and
authorization, and (3) information sharing or damages. If construed liberally,
158 Civic Ctr. Motors, Ltd. v. Mason St. Imp. Cars, Ltd., 387 F. Supp. 2d 378, 381
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (referencing Nexans Wires S.A. v. Sark-USA Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 468,
474 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc. 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 252
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); see also Creative Computing v. Getloaded.com, L.L.C. 386 F.3d 930,
936 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Damages are indeed limited to those caused by the impairment,
which may not be the same thing as the expenses of the victim subsequent to the
impairment.").
159 Civic Ctr. Motors, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 381-82; see also Tyco Int'l (U.S.) Inc. v.
Doe, No. 01 Civ. 3856 (RCC) (DF), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11800, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y.
July 11, 2003) ("While ... the CFAA allows recovery for losses beyond mere physical
damage to property, the additional types of damages awarded by courts under the Act
have generally been limited to those costs necessary to assess the damage caused to the
plaintiffs computer system or to resecure the system in the wake of a hacking attack.");
Nexans Wires, 319 F. Supp. 2d at 477 ("[P]laintiffs' lost revenue due to lost business
opportunity does not constitute 'loss' under the statute.").
160 The economic damages language applies in the civil context. In a civil action,
damages for a violation involving Section 1030(a)(5)(B)(i) are limited to economic
damages. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (Supp. III 2003).
161 E.g., Creative Computing v. Getloaded.com, L.L.C., 386 F.3d 930, 936 (9th Cir.
2004).
162 Id. at 935. The court went on to state that "[w]hen an individual or firm's money
or property are impaired in value, or money or property is lost, or money must be spent to
restore or maintain some aspect of a business affected by a violation, those are 'economic
damages."' Id. In making this statement, the court turned to the Black's Law Dictionary
definition of consequential economic losses, which included lost profits and the loss of
goodwill or reputation. Id. at 935 n.19 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 552 (8th ed.
2004)).
163 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B)(i) (Supp. III 2003).
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these provisions may encompass open wireless access. However, given the
high damage threshold and ambiguity surrounding authorization, open
wireless access likely escapes the CFAA's reach. 164
a. Favoring Liability Under the CFAA
For users to be liable for unauthorized access, they must have the
requisite criminal intent under the statute. The CFAA requires intentional
conduct on the part of the user. 165 Under Morris, the intentional mens rea
applies to the "'accesses' phrase" of the statute, and not to the "damages"
phrase. 166 Although the term "access" is undefined, some courts have
broadly construed it in a manner that could encompass conduct such as a
computer communicating to another computer via a wireless network.' 67
After clearing the intent and access hurdles, users' open wireless conduct
must be without authorization for liability to attach.
Unauthorized access under the CFAA may be established by a terms of
service violation or implicitly. Most ISPs restrict their subscribers from
redistributing networking/Internet services.168 Although these terms of
service expressly apply to the subscriber, they may impact other users as
well. Users engaging in open Wi-Fi access participate in conduct that
164But see Kerr, supra note 66, at 1598-99. Kerr notes a trend in civil cases
interpreting the CFAA that leads him to posit that "any computer use that violates an
implicit or explicit contract with the computer's owner exceeds the authorization that the
owner has granted the user, and therefore violates the federal unauthorized access
statute." Id.
165 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(2), 1030(a)(5)(A)(ii) (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
166 United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 509 (2d Cir. 1991). But see, supra notes
132-34 and accompanying text, discussing whether the intentional mens rea applies
solely to "access" or to "unauthorized access" and the implications thereof
167 See Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Disc., Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255,
1272-73 (N.D. Iowa 2000); see also Hunter, supra note 61, at 477 ("[B]ecause of the
technical requirements of the Internet's fundamental transmission protocol, TCP/IP,
which relays messages through many computers before they reach their final destination,
the person initiating the transmission actually accesses each computer in the transmission
chain.").
168 See Time Warner Cable Residential Services Subscriber Agreement, at § 4(b),
http://help.twcable.com/htm/twc sub agreement2.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2006) ("I
will not resell or redistribute (whether for a fee or otherwise) the Services, or any portion
thereof, or charge others to use the Services, or any portion thereof."); SBC Yahoo!
Terms of Service, at § 14, http://sbc.yahoo.com/terms/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2006) ("You
agree that the Service is not to be used to trunk or facilitate public internet access
('Hotspots') or any other Public Use of the Service, except for FreedomLink.").
However, not all ISPs share this view; Speakeasy explicitly allows for wireless sharing.
See Speakeasy WiFi NetShare Service, http://www.speakeasy.net/netshare/terms/#Wi-
Fipolicy (last visited Aug. 16, 2006).
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violates the terms of service. This violation may be sufficient to establish that
the users' access is without authorization. 169 Unauthorized access may also
be found implicitly by extending the court's reasoning in EF Cultural
Travel. 170 The EF Cultural Travel court noted that the "lack of authorization
may be implicit, rather than explicit" and rejected "that there is a
'presumption' of open access to Internet information." 171 Taken together,
one may argue for a presumption of unauthorized access, rendering users'
access to an open wireless network unauthorized without express or implicit
authorization.' 72 Once unauthorized access is established, the analysis shifts
to obtaining information and damages.
Damages present a significant challenge to liability for open Wi-Fi
access under the CFAA. The CFAA requires users who gain unauthorized
access to obtain information 73 and/or have their conduct result in damage
that causes at least a $5,000 lOSS.174 The broad language of section
1030(a)(2) likely encompasses standard communications that occur between
computers on a network (i.e., routing information, IP addresses, trading data
packets, etc.). 175 Damages may include harm to the functionality of a
169 Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450-51 (E.D. Va. 1998);
see also Kerr, supra note 66, at 1637-41. Kerr notes that precedent established in civil
cases that addresses authorization in the breach of contract context have provided
prosecutors with a "broad and powerful tool" to attack unauthorized access conduct. Id.
at 1640; see also Hale, supra note 35, at 548 ("With regard to finding unauthorized
access through a 'Terms of Service' violation, the AOL cases ... provide precedent for
enforcing such terms on third parties with no privity of contract and no notice of the
terms.").
170 EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 2003).
171 Id. at 63.
172 See Hale, supra note 35, at 548 ("The line of reasoning in [EF Cultural Travel
BV v.] Zefer further supports this view to the extent that the end user remains
'unauthorized' by default, absent some explicit or implicit agreement."); see also
Physicians Interactive v. Lathian Sys. Inc., CA-03-1193-A, 2003 U.S. Dist LEXIS 22868,
at *20 (E.D. Va. Dec. 5, 2003) (calling defendant's argument that a website with no
posted limits on access is open to Internet users for all purposes an "extravagant
assertion... [that] appears to circumvent the spirit of the CFAA, and any other type of
statute designed to protect website owners against computer hackers.").
173 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (2000).
174 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B)(i) (Supp. III 2003).
175 See Hale, supra note 35, at 548 ("[A]ccess to any WLAN involves some
exchange of information that typically passes between computers (IP addresses, data
packets, etc.) as a means of gaining access to the Internet."); Kern, supra note 41, at 135
("The language of Section 1030(A)(2) [sic] is broad enough to suggest that, by accessing
routing and addressing information, a roaming Wi-Fi user 'obtains information' for
purposes of the statute.").
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network, such as slowdowns or diminished capacity.176 Users who access an
open wireless network are likely to cause a slowdown (albeit a small one) of
the network, causing "damage." This damage must cause aggregate loss of at
least $5,000.177 Admittedly, users who access open wireless networks for the
purpose of email or web browsing are unlikely to meet the statutory amount
because their activity uses so little bandwidth. 178 However, users who
repeatedly engage in heavy bandwidth network activity over a long period of
time, such as downloading movies or other large files, may cause sufficient
loss to rise to the level of liability under the statute. 179 This may be
particularly likely in circumstances where the WLAN provider incurs
expenses investigating and securing access. 180 Further, if the WLAN
provider makes use of the network in a business context, aggregate loss may
include economic losses caused by network slowdowns and push the amount
past the statutory threshold. 181
In theory, users who engage in open wireless access violate the CFAA.
They engage in intentional access. This access is unauthorized because it
may violate the terms of service governing the WAP or violate the
presumption that uninvited access is unauthorized. Standard network
communications between computers establish information sharing sufficient
for liability under Section 1030(a)(2). The damage caused by users'
slowdown and capacity diminishing conduct could potentially create an
aggregate loss in excess of $5,000, establishing liability under
Section 1030(a)(5)(A)(iii). However, this outlook broadly construes the
terms of the CFAA; under a narrower construction, the CFAA will likely not
apply to open wireless access.
17 6 Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Disc., Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1274
n. 18 (N.D. Iowa 2000).
177 18 U.S.C. § 1030(B)(i) (Supp. III 2003).
178 Bandwidth usage is difficult to quantify. A fairly common measure for the cost
to an ISP of delivering email is $ .001 per email. Earthlink, Inc. v. Carmack, No. 1:02-
CV-3041-TWT, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9963, at *15 (N.D. Ga. May 7, 2003). By
analogy, the cost to WLAN operators of email traffic would seem low.
179 One article estimates that downloading a complete ninety to one hundred twenty
minute movie can consume bandwidth equivalent to sending more than one hundred fifty
thousand emails. Freshnews.com, Websense Helps Organizations Cool Down Bandwidth
Loss and Illegal File Sharing, Aug 16, 2004,
http://www.freshnews.com/news/computers-intemet/article_18971 .html?Websense (last
visited Aug. 16, 2004).
180 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(l 1) (Supp. III 2003); Civic Ctr. Motors, Ltd. v. Mason
St. Imp. Cars, Ltd., 387 F. Supp. 2d 378, 381-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
181 See Creative Computing v. Getloaded.com, L.L.C., 386 F.3d 930, 935 (9th Cir.
2004). The court permits loss of goodwill and loss of business amongst the aggregate
economic damage.
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b. Against Liability Under the CFAA
The intent requirement of the CFAA may be construed in a manner that
makes liability for open wireless access more difficult to achieve. As stated
in Morris, the intent mens rea applies to the "'accesses' phrase."' 182 By using
the word "phrase," the Morris court's interpretation of the mens rea
requirement could apply to "access a protected computer without
authorization." If the intent requirement applies to the whole "access" phrase,
the prosecutor or plaintiff must prove that a defendant not only intended to
access, but also intended to access without authorization. This heightened
mens rea requirement could limit the applicability of the CFAA to open
wireless access due to the difficulty of proving intent to engage in
unauthorized conduct.' 83  Even assuming that intent is established,
unauthorized access presents problems in the context of wireless networking.
Taking an intended function (i.e., means or purpose) approach to
unauthorized access may preclude liability under the CFAA. Critical to the
Morris court's determination of unauthorized access was the fact that the
defendant did not use email capabilities "in any way related to their intended
function."' 184 Applied to wireless, users who access an open wireless network
are using the network for its intended function, and thus, their access would
be authorized. Additionally, open wireless access may be authorized unless it
is expressly prohibited by the network operator. 185 Both these perspectives
support the contention that open wireless access may be conduct allowed by
the CFAA. In the event that unauthorized access is found, users are not likely
to have obtained information or caused sufficient loss to trigger the statute.
Simply accessing a wireless network should not subject a user to
liability. The legislative history of the 1996 amendment to the CFAA
indicates that "the term 'obtaining information' includes merely reading
it."'1 86 This indicates that the lower threshold of "information" under the
CFAA is defined as something readable, with the implication of being
readable to a person (not a computer). Unless users view content from
182 United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 509 (2d Cir. 1991).
183 This issue obviously hinges significantly on the interpretation of unauthorized
access. In the case of Wi-Fi, if merely accessing a Wi-Fi network is considered
unauthorized, then the intent requirement's application to "without authorization" is
effectively irrelevant, as simple access would meet the requisite level of intent. However,
if authorization depends on more than mere access, then the breadth of the intent mens
rea takes on greater importance.
184 Morris, 928 F.2d at 510.
185 EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 2003) ("[W]e
think that the public website provider can easily spell out explicitly what is
forbidden ....").
186 S. REP. No. 104-357, at 7 (1996).
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another computer, they do not obtain information as contemplated by
Congress. Further, the exchange of networking protocols inherent to access
does not rise to the level of obtaining information because it involves no
"readable" information-users do not "read" the information exchanged.
Users accessing an open wireless network will not likely cause sufficient
loss to satisfy the terms of the CFAA. Although damages may include
network slowdowns, the aggregated loss from these slowdowns probably
would not amount to a figure approaching the $5,000 required by statute.
Even in the case of heavy bandwidth users, evidentiary problems would
likely be prohibitive; wireless providers, particularly non-business providers,
would have difficultly establishing the loss caused by diminished network
capacity.
Users who engage in open wireless access are unlikely to be liable under
the CFAA. 187 The primary difficulties lie with authorization, obtaining
information, and/or loss. Courts must take a narrow view of authorization to
deem access of an open network unauthorized. Even if unauthorized, users
who access open wireless networks for "typical" internet conduct (email,
web browsing, etc.) would be hard pressed to satisfy the requirement for
obtaining information or meet the $5,000 threshold for loss caused by their
damaging access. Despite the CFAA, liability may still arise under state law.
187 It does not appear that CFAA claims are common in instances of unauthorized
access. One exception is the case of Stefan Puffer. Puffer worked as a computer security
analyst for the Central Technology Department of Harris County (Houston), Texas.
Rosanna Ruiz, Computer Expert Indicted in Alleged Hacking, HOUSTON CHRON., July 25,
2002, at 26A. Puffer provided a demonstration to a county official and newspaper
reporter about the ease of access to the county district clerk's wireless network. Id.
Prosecutors indicted Puffer on a charge that he violated the CFAA, alleging that the
$5,000 damage requirement of the statute was met by the financial costs of staffing
changes implemented to determine the nature of the intrusion and prevent future wireless
break-ins. Rosanna Ruiz, Federal Trial Starts for Man Who Hacked County Computer,
HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 19, 2003, at 16A. The jury acquitted Puffer in fifteen minutes,
with one juror stating "[w]e didn't feel he intentionally wanted to do damage, but just to
embarrass [the county]." Rosanna Ruiz, Jurors Acquit Man of Hacking System at District
Clerk's Office, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 21, 2003, at 26A. Despite the lack of conviction,
federal officials remained adamant about the viability of a CFAA claim, with the U.S.
Attorney on the case stating that "[t]he allegation is that this man intentionally invaded a
cyberspace that did not belong to him" and that "[w]e should not allow that intrusion in
our homes, and we can't allow it to systems so critical to (daily) operations." Id.
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B. State Statutory Law
The varying terms of state statutes addressing open wireless access make
determining whether this conduct gives rise to liability challenging. 188 Some
statutes evidence language that would clearly encompass open wireless
access whereas others would prohibit extending liability to this conduct. In
between is a gray area where the exact application of the statute is unclear.
Unfortunately, case law has done little to illuminate the proper application of
these statutes.
1. Case Interpretation
In contrast to the CFAA, courts have rarely had the occasion to consider
state statutory law in the area of unauthorized access.189 The cases that have
188 States may further complicate matters by pursuing a conviction for open wireless
access conduct based on traditional theft or trespass statutes. In the state of Washington,
police arrested a man for repeatedly using a coffee shop's wireless Internet service.
Stephanie Rice, Accused Wi-Fi Thief Pleads to Trespass, COLUMBIAN, Aug. 16, 2006, at
Al. Alexander Smith would park outside the coffee shop, then access the Internet via his
laptop. Id. The coffee shop provided the Internet service for customers, but Mr. Smith did
not make a purchase and refused the shop's repeated requests that he leave the area. Id.
Although Washington has a computer trespass statute, Mr. Smith ultimately pled guilty to
criminal trespass, a different statute within the criminal code. Id.; see WASH. REv. CODE
§ 9A.52.120 (2006) (Washington's computer trespass statute); WASH. REv. CODE
§ 9A.52.080 (2006) (Washington's criminal trespass statute). Commenting on the case,
the Clark County Deputy Prosecutor noted that "[tlhe law hasn't caught up with the idea
of stealing Internet service." Id.
189 The weight of a state statute depends heavily on the interpretation and
application of these terms. Unfortunately, this is largely a theoretical exercise as only a
minimum of cases have explored these statutes and have not necessarily done so in a
manner that provides much guidance. See People v. Lawton, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 521, 523
(Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1996) (interpreting the unauthorized access provision of
California's computer crime statute); Wesley Coll. v. Pitts, 974 F. Supp. 375, 391-92 (D.
Del. 1997) (construing Delaware's unauthorized access statute); Gallagher v. State, 618
So.2d 757, 757 n.58 (Ct. App. Fla. 1993) (Glickstein, C.J., dissenting) (discussing
unauthorized access under Florida law delineating offenses against computer users);
Fugarino v. State, 531 S.E.2d 187, 187-89 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (construing Georgia's
computer trespass statute); State v. Hargrove, 67 P.3d 111, 114 (Idaho Ct. App. 2003)
(overturning conviction under Idaho unauthorized access law); State v. Rupnick, 125
P.3d 541, 556 (Kan. 2005) (upholding validity of Kansas computer trespass statute); State
v. Allen, 917 P.2d 848 (Kan. 1996) (discussed infra notes 190-98 and accompanying
text); Commonwealth v. Cocke, 58 S.W.3d 891, 894 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001) (declaring first
degree unlawful access void for vagueness); Commonwealth v. Farley, No. 95-934, 1996
Mass. Super. LEXIS 410, at *13-14 (Super. Ct. Mass. Oct. 18, 1996) (upholding
constitutionality of unauthorized access statute); People v. Schilke, No. 253117, 2005
Mich. App. LEXIS 1079, at *8-9 (Mich. Ct. App. May 3, 2005) (affirming conviction
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considered these laws have done so mostly in the context of defining the
scope of access.
In State v. Allen, 190 the Kansas Supreme Court set forth the notion that
access means interaction with a computer beyond merely potentially logging
in. Allen used his computer to dial Southwestern Bell computer modems; the
company believed this act would lead to Allen acquiring the ability to make
free long distance telephone calls. 191 Upon dial-up, Allen faced a prompt
requiring him to enter a username and password. However, the evidence
indicated that Allen never attempted to respond to the prompt. 192
Considering this evidence, the court held that Allen never accessed the
Southwestern Bell computers. 193
The Allen Court interpreted access to mean something more than making
contact with a computer. The State argued that Allen's conduct fell within
the meaning of "to approach," which was part of the statutory definition of
"access." 194 In considering the competing arguments, the court first turned to
a National Institute of Justice manual containing the comment that "[t]he use
of the word 'approach' in the definition of 'access,' if taken literally, could
mean that any unauthorized physical proximity to a computer could
under Michigan unauthorized access statute); People v. Helleman, No. 217190, 1999
Mich. App. LEXIS 2325 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 1999) (discussing intentional
unauthorized access); State v. Gaikwad, 793 A.2d 39 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002)
(discussing intentional unauthorized access); People v. Angeles, 180 Misc. 2d 146, 149
(N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1999) (granting defendant's motion to dismiss for failure of the
prosecution to state in the charge that the computer was protected, an element of the
offense); People v. Johnson, 148 Misc. 2d 103, 112 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1990) (denying
defendant's motion to dismiss unauthorized use charge); State v. Burrell, No. 76890,
2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4169, at *20-21 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2000) (evidence
insufficient to support unauthorized access conviction); State v. Washington, 710 N.E.2d
307, 320 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (upholding conviction under unauthorized use statute);
State v. Lebron, 646 N.E.2d 481, 484-85 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (upholding conviction
under unauthorized use statute); State v. Schwartz, 21 P.3d 1128, 1138 (Or. Ct. App.
2001) (affirming conviction for unauthorized access under state computer crime law);
Commonwealth v. McFadden, 850 A.2d 1290, 1294 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (upholding
sentence imposed for violation of unauthorized use statute); Superior Court Chain Store
Maint. v. Nat'l Glass & Gate Serv., Inc., No. PB 0 1-3522, 2004 R.I. Super. LEXIS 81, at
*31-36 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 21, 2004) (discussing authorization); see also Kerr, supra
note 66, at 1617 n.86 and surrounding text.
190 State v. Allen, 917 P.2d 848 (Kan. 1996).
191 Id. at 850.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 853. The Allen Court evaluated unauthorized access in the context of a
felony, thus requiring damage done to the system. However, Kansas provides for
misdemeanor unauthorized access, an offense that does not contain damage as an
element.
194 Id. at 852.
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constitute a crime." 195 Next, the court looked to Webster's Dictionary, which
defined "access" as the "freedom or ability to obtain or make use of."'
19 6
Minding the words of the National Institute of Justice and the dictionary, the
Allen court found that because Allen did not "proceed[] beyond the initial
banner and enter[] appropriate passwords, he could not be said to have had
the ability to make use of Southwestern Bell's computers."'197 While the
Allen Court was unwilling to allow the definition of access to encompass
approach, 198 another state court did not feel so constrained.
In State v. Riley,199 the Washington Supreme Court found that approach
represents a viable form of access. The Riley Court faced similar facts as in
Allen; the defendant used a computer to repeatedly dial the general access
number of a telephone company and input a random six digit number in
attempt to acquire long distance telephone services. 200 The Washington
computer trespass statute defined access as "to approach ... or otherwise
make use of any resources of a computer, directly or by electronic means."
20 1
The court held that Riley's conduct satisfied the statutory definition; Riley's
approach and entry of the random number constituted approach, and thus,
access.
202
In contrast to access, few courts have addressed what constitutes
authorization. This lack of clarity is further compounded by the fact that few
states define what constitutes authorization. 20 3 The states that do provide a
195 Allen, 917 P.2d at 852 (quoting DONN B. PARKER, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
JUSTICE, COMPUTER CRIME: CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESOURCE MANUAL 84 (2d ed. 1989)).
196 Allen, 917 P.2d at 853 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 7
(1977)).
197 Allen, 917 P. 2d at 853.
198 See Kerr, supra note 66, at 1624-26. Kerr describes the Allen Court as adopting
a "virtual reality" approach, whereby Allen must have gotten inside the computer for his
conduct to be considered access. Id.
199 State v. Riley, 846 P.2d 1365 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).
200 Id. at 1367-68. It is unclear on the facts whether Riley in fact obtained valid
access codes that would have enabled him to procure free long distance services.
201 Id. at 1373 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.52.010(6) (West Supp. 2006)).
202 Riley, 846 P.2d at 1373.
203 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5.5-101(1) (2005); GA. CODE. ANN. § 16-9-92(18) (Lexis
Supp. 2006); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 708-890 (Supp. 2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§ 431(11) (2006); MINN. STAT. § 609.87 Subd. 2a (2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 638:16(11) (West Supp. 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-23(q) (2005); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-453(la) (2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 1 I-52-1(15)(v) (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-16-
10(1) (West Supp. 2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-601(2) (2003); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-6-702(2) (Lexis Supp. 2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.2 (Lexis Supp. 2005); W.
VA. CODE § 61-3C-3(b) (2005). In the absence of a definition, at least one court has
turned to Black's Law Dictionary and Webster's Dictionary for guidance. See Briggs v.
State, 704 A.2d 904, 909 (Md. 1998).
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statutory definition vary regarding the conduct encompassed by the term. At
one extreme, authorization requires the express consent of the owner.204 At
the other extreme are statutes that define authorization under a
reasonableness standard20 5 or based on implied consent.20 6 Somewhere in the
middle are statutes that define authorization generically in terms of consent
or permission.207 Unfortunately, state case law does little to clarify the
meaning of authorization. The small number of state cases that have
addressed authorization have arisen primarily in the context of employee
misconduct.208
204 See, for example, Colorado, which defines authorization as "the express consent
of a person ... to use said person's ... computer network." COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-5.5-
101(1) (2005).
205 While New Jersey defines authorization as permission, authority or consent, the
statute goes on to provide that "[a]n actor has authorization if a reasonable person would
believe that the act was authorized." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-23(q) (2005).
206 See, e.g., South Carolina, which provides that "'[u]nauthorized access' means
access of a ... computer network not explicitly or implicitly authorized by the
appropriate principal." S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-16-10(l) (West Supp. 2005). Tennessee
provides perhaps the broadest definition, stating that "'[a]uthorization' means any and all
forms of consent, including both implicit and explicit consent." TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-
14-601(2) (2003).
207 See, e.g., Maine, which states that "'unauthorized' mean[s] not having consent or
permission of the owner." ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 431(11) (2006). These
definitions offer little clarity to the meaning of authorization, as they turn on the
interpretations of permission and consent, which are themselves undefined terms.
Minnesota provides an exception to this vagary; while the statute defines authorization as
permission, it goes on to state that "[a]uthorization may be limited by the owner by: (1)
giving the user actual notice orally or in writing; (2) posting a written notice in a
prominent location adjacent to the computer being used; or (3) using a notice displayed
on or announced by the computer being used." MINN. STAT. § 609.87 Subd. 2a (2003).
The last two options illustrate the conundrum presented by Wi-Fi; wireless networking
changes the location dynamic such that posting or displaying notice by a computer
becomes impractical.
208 See Fugarino v. State, 531 S.E.2d 187, 189 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that
Fugarino lacked the authority to delete portions of a company's computer program, as
indicated by the testimony of the company's owner that no such permission was granted
and by the "vindictive and retaliatory manner" of Fugarino's conduct); State v. Olson,
735 P.2d 1362, 1365-66 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that police officer's access of
police database for personal use was not without authority; permission to use the database
was not predicated on the uses made of the data; thus while against departmental policy,
police officer still had authority to access); Briggs v. State, 704 A.2d 904, 909-10 (Md.
1998) (holding that a system administrator had authority to access computer; thus, while
his conduct was inappropriate, he had the authority to engage in it) (noting also that
Briggs likely exceeded the scope of his authority, but the Maryland statute prohibits only
unauthorized access, not access outside the scope of authority); see also Kerr, supra note
66, at 1632-37.
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2. Statutes Supporting Liability for Open Wireless Access
The statutes that provide the clearest indication of liability for open
wireless access premise authorization on express consent. Colorado's statute
prohibits the knowing access of any computer network without
authorization. 20 9 The statute goes on to define "authorization" solely in terms
of "express consent. '210 California's computer crimes statute targets the
knowing access of a computer network without permission.21t One
commentator has indicated that the California Attorney General's Office
would consider access to be "without permission" if absent express
permission.212
These statutes could give rise to liability for open wireless access. Users
of an open wireless network do not obtain the express consent of the
networks' operators. Absent express consent, the users do not have the
authorization to use the wireless networks. Their lack of authorization or
permission makes the users liable for their open wireless access.
3. Statutes Limiting Liability for Open Wireless Access
In contrast to Colorado and California, some state statutes indicate that
open wireless access is permissible absent particular conduct by network
operators. New York provides the strongest example of limiting the liability
of open wireless access. New York's unauthorized use statute prohibits the
knowing use of a computer without authorization, but additionally requires
that "the computer utilized is equipped or programmed with any device or
coding system, a function of which is to prevent the unauthorized use of said
computer or computer system."213 Thus, open wireless access would only be
209 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5.5-102 (2005).
210 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5.5-101(1) (West Supp. 2006). Other statutes use the
"express consent" language, but typically provide for the option of implied consent as
well.
211 CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(c)(7) (West Supp. 2006).
212 Kern, supra note 41, at 151 n. 156 and accompanying text (citing a June 2004
telephone interview with the California Deputy Attorney General).
213 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 156.05 (1999). The force of the statute was reaffirmed in
People v. Angeles, 180 Misc. 2d 146, 148-49 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1999), where the court
stated:
The statute, however, on its face does not make criminal the mere use or accessing
of a computer system without permission or authority. The Legislature has imposed
the additional requirement that the computer be "equipped or programmed with any
device or coding system, a function of which is to prevent the unauthorized use of
[the] computer or computer system. The legislative history of the statute makes clear
that this requirement was included on the ground that "[s]uch protective devices
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actionable under this statute if the network operator has enabled encryption
or password protection on the network, and users usurped this protection.
While New York explicitly requires security protection, other states
imply a connection between authorization and password protection or notice.
In prohibiting knowing access without authorization, Massachusetts also
states that "[t]he requirement of a password or other authentication to gain
access shall constitute notice that access is limited to authorized users." 214
Minnesota defines authorization to include options whereby the owner of a
computer network can limit authorization by: "(1) giving the user actual
notice orally or in writing; (2) posting a written notice in a prominent
location adjacent to the computer being used; or (3) using a notice displayed
on or announced by the computer being used. '215 By creating a presumption
that a use is unauthorized if security or notice is provided, these statutes also
create an implication that silence does not necessarily constitute a lack of
authorization. 216 An open wireless network by definition is not protected by
security measures. Thus, users accessing an open wireless network may be
considered authorized in the absence of security or notice. While
construction of these statutes requires interpreting the silence of the statute,
other states provide less guidance regarding open access conduct.
4. Statutes Inconclusive on Liability for Open Wireless Access
It is unclear how a number of state statutes apply to open wireless access,
mostly because of questions of what constitutes unauthorized access. Some
states provide a reasonableness standard, others speak of implicit consent,
and still more provide no guidance at all regarding authorization.
Some states permit access if users reasonably believed their access was
authorized. For example, New Hampshire provides an affirmative defense to
an unauthorized access prosecution whereby the accused may show that
"[t]he person reasonably believed that the owner of the ... computer
network... had authorized him or her to access; or ... [t]he person
reasonably could not have known that his or her access was unauthorized. '217
provide the first line of defense against unauthorized intrusion into a computer
system."
Id. at 148-49 (emphasis original) (citations omitted).
214 MASS. GEN. LAWS Ch. 266, § 120F (2002).
215 MINN. STAT. 609.87 subd. 2a (2003).
216 Kern, supra note 41, at 144-45 ("These statutes do not have an equivalent
presumption that use is authorized if the network operator does not use security measures.
However, these statures imply that silence does not indicate a lack of authorization.").
217 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 638:17(I)(a)-(c) (West Supp. 2005); See OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2913.04(D) citing § 2913.03(C)(1) (West 2006) (providing an affirmative
defense to unauthorized access, as empowered by Section 2913.04, where "[a]t the time
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This standard cuts both ways in terms of liability. On one hand, users may
not be able to ascertain information regarding the open wireless network they
are accessing, and thus, could not reasonably know whether their access is
authorized. On the other hand, if users are outside the range of any familiar
networks, the logical assumption is that the network is under another
operator's control, and the inquiry turns to whether it is reasonable that the
operator would authorize access to the network by design or mistake.
Other states provide an equally ambiguous standard by allowing for
implied consent. South Carolina defines "unauthorized access" as access of a
computer network "not explicitly or implicitly authorized" by the network
operator.218 Permitting implied consent may limit the applicability of state
statutes to open wireless access. This depends on the presumption of whether
a network left unsecured is impliedly open. If this presumption is valid, an
open network indicates implied consent on behalf of the network operator for
users to access his or her network. If this presumption is invalid, liability may
still attach for access conduct.
Even more states are silent as to what represents unauthorized access.
The majority of state statutes merely prohibit unauthorized access; they do
not specify what the term "unauthorized access" means.2 19 The lack of
statutory guidance and the lack of case law addressing the authorization issue
leaves users to their own devices to try and determine whether accessing an
open wireless network constitutes criminal conduct under state law.
While the aforementioned sections focus on the statutory construction of
unauthorized access, damages also factor heavily into the liability equation.
Several states do not require that users who commit unauthorized access
cause any damage. 220 In essence, these states criminalize the mere act of
unauthorized access, which broadens the scope of liability under these states'
laws.221 Other states provide different tiers of damages tied to offense levels.
Any statute that introduces a monetary damage component raises problems
of proof because of the difficulty associated with demonstrating (1) the
of the alleged offense, the actor, though mistaken, reasonably believed that the actor was
authorized to use or operate the property").
218 S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-16-10(1) (West Supp. 2005); see also W. VA. CODE § 61-
3C-3(b)(2005) ("'Authorization' means the express or implied consent given by a person
to another to access" that person's computer network.).
219 See supra note 99, identifying the states that define "authorization."
220 Of the states that do require the unauthorized access to cause damage, the
threshold amount of loss is relatively low. Thus, in general, the inquiry into damages is
less germane to the question of liability for unauthorized access under state law as
opposed to liability under the CFAA.
221 By strictly criminalizing the act of unauthorized access, these statutes extend
liability beyond the scope of the CFAA and many state statutes, all of which require
damage.
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damage caused by the unauthorized access, and (2) the loss caused by the
damage. Liability under state law varies greatly based on the differing state
statutes. Liability under the common law suffers a similar fate based on the
scope that courts choose to give the doctrine of trespass to chattels.
C. The Doctrine of Trespass to Chattels
The scope and applicability of this common law doctrine depends largely
on matters of judicial interpretation. Courts have varied the scope of the
trespass to chattels doctrine. In some jurisdictions, the doctrine expansively
applies to a variety of Internet related conduct. Other jurisdictions limit the
scope of trespass to chattels to tangible items. Courts' construction of the
trespass to chattels doctrine may be determinative of liability for open
wireless access.
1. Case Interpretation
Courts have interpreted the trespass to chattels doctrine in a manner that
accommodates a variety of Internet related issues. In Register.com v. Verio,
the court upheld a preliminary injunction premised on a trespass to chattels
claim regarding Verio's use of search robots. 222 Other courts have found that
trespass to chattels in "computer space" may exist where defendants caused
misdirected emails to be sent-conduct that was outside the scope of the
terms and conditions that bound the defendants.223 Several cases have arisen
in the context of email spam224 and spyware (or similar information
gathering software). 225 One court has even specified the exact elements of a
claim in this area. The court held that to maintain a trespass claim premised
222 Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, 356 F.3d 393, 404-05 (2d Cir. 2004).
223 Hotmail Corp. v. Van $ Money Pie, Inc., No. C98-20064, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10729, at * 19-20 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1998) (using the language "trespassed on Hotmail's
computer space," one of the first acknowledgements that the trespass doctrine may be
construed to encompass electronic conduct).
224 CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1027 (S.D.
Ohio 1997) ("Defendants' intentional use of plaintiffs proprietary computer
equipment ... is an actionable trespass to plaintiffs chattel."); Am. Online v. IMS, 24 F.
Supp. 2d 548, 550-51 (E.D. Va. 1998) (granting summary judgment to AOL on trespass
to chattels claim); Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451-52 (E.D. Va.
1998) ("Courts have recognized that the transmission of unsolicited bulk e-mails can
constitute a trespass to chattels."); Am. Online, Inc. v. National Health Care Disc., Inc.,
121 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1277 (N.D. Iowa 2000).
225 Sotelo v. DirectRevenue, L.L.C., 384 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1229-33 (N.D. I11.
2005); Southwest Airlines v. Farechase, Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d 435, 442 (N.D. Tex. 2004);
eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Register.com, 356
F.3d at 404.
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on unauthorized access to a computer system, "the plaintiff must establish:
(1) defendant intentionally and without authorization interfered with
plaintiffs possessory interest in the computer system; and (2) defendant's
unauthorized use proximately resulted in damage to plaintiff. '226 In contrast,
some courts have expressly rejected the application of trespass to chattels to
Internet issues.
State and federal courts have noted limits on the application of the
doctrine of trespass to chattels to electronic communication. In Intel v.
Hamidi, the court found that "under California law [trespass to chattels] does
not encompass, and should not be extended to encompass, an electronic
communication that neither damages the recipient computer system nor
impairs its functioning." 227 Hamidi sent emails critical of Intel's employment
practices to other employees via the company's email system.228 The
California Supreme Court noted that the emails "caused neither physical
damage nor functional disruption" but rather "caused discussion among
employees and managers."2 29 Intel asserted damages in the form of the loss
of productivity as a result of the employee discussions. The court rejected
these consequential economic damages as an actionable injury to the
company's interest in its computers. Notably, the court explicitly stated that
email is not necessarily exempt from ordinary tort liability, referencing the
harmful effects of large quantities of spam on a computer system's
functioning. 230
A federal district court in Tennessee construing Florida law further
limited the doctrine of trespass to chattels to movable personal property.231 In
Partsbase, the court considered allegations that the defendant trespassed by
hacking into Partsbase's database and accessing customer information. While
the court noted that other jurisdictions have allowed actions for trespass to
electronic resources under a trespass to chattels theory, Florida does not
allow the doctrine to be characterized in such a manner. Citing a Florida
appellate court case rejecting classifying a bank account as a chattel, the
Partsbase court noted that in Florida, "an action for trespass to chattels must
involve movable personal property. '232 The database at issue in the case did
not constitute movable property, and because Florida "does not recognize a
226 Bidder's Edge, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1069-70.
227 Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 300 (Cal. 2003).
228 Id. at 299.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 300.
231 Inventory Locator Serv., L.L.C. v. Partsbase, Inc., No. 02-2695, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 32680, at *34-37 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 6, 2005).
232 Id. at *35.
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cause of action for trespass to chattels in cyberspace[,]" the court dismissed
the common law trespass count in the case. 233
Damages present a difficult issue in a court's application of trespass to
chattels to Internet related conduct. While courts may issue an injunction
premised merely on the trespass, 234 for the doctrine to be actionable, a
plaintiff must demonstrate damage. In CompuServe v. Cyberpromotions, the
court discussed the nature of actionable damages, focusing on the harm to the
personal property or diminution of its quality, condition, or value as a result
of defendant's use as a predicate for liability. 235 CompuServe involved spam,
and the court found that span diminished the value of CompuServe's
equipment by occupying disk space and draining processing power. The
Bidder's Edge court used similar reasoning, finding the potential for damage
in the defendant's admittedly small use of plaintiff eBay's computer
system. 236 In upholding the preliminary injunction against Bidder's Edge, the
Court stated that
it is undisputed that eBay's server and its capacity are personal property,
and that BE's searches use a portion of this property. Even if, as BE argues,
its searches use only a small amount of eBay's computer system capacity,
BE has nonetheless deprived eBay of the ability to use that portion of its
personal property for its own purposes. The law recognizes no such right to
use another's personal property. 237
233 Id. at *36.
234 See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 404-5 (2d Cir. 2004);
Physicians Interactive v. Lathian Systems, Inc., No. CA-03-1193-A, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22868, at *26-27 (E.D. Va. Dec. 5, 2003).
235 CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1022 (S.D.
Ohio 1997) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218(b) (1965)). The court went
on to quote the comments to section 218, stating:
An unprivileged use or other intermeddling with a chattel which results in
actual impairment of its physical condition, quality or value to the possessor makes
the actor liable for the loss thus caused. In the great majority of cases, the actor's
intermeddling with the chattel impairs the value of it to the possessor, as
distinguished from the mere affront to his dignity as possessor, only by some
impairment of the physical condition of the chattel. There may, however, be
situations in which the value to the owner of a particular type of chattel may be
impaired by dealing with it in a manner that does not affect its physical
condition .... In such a case, the intermeddling is actionable even though the
physical condition of the chattel is not impaired.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 cmt. h (1965).
236 eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
237 Id. at 1072; see also Oyster Software, Inc. v. Forms Processing, Inc., No. C-00-
0724, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22520, at *35-41 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2001).
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In contrast to CompuServe and Bidder's Edge, other courts have found
that a negligible amount of computer use does not constitute sufficient
damage to render a trespass claim actionable. In Ticketmaster v. Tickets.com,
the court rejected a preliminary injunction barring defendant's use of a robot
web crawler (similar to that used by the defendant in Bidder's Edge) because
the defendant's use of plaintiff's system was "very small" and did not
"interfere[] to any extent with the regular business" of plaintiff.238
2. Liability Under the Doctrine of Trespass to Chattels
Liability under a trespass to chattels theory depends on how liberally the
doctrine is applied. Some courts have shown a willingness to extend the
doctrine to encompass Internet conduct, while others have been reluctant to
permit that far a reach. Even amongst those courts that have extended the
doctrine, questions still arise regarding what constitutes sufficient damage to
render a trespass to chattels claim actionable.
The doctrine of trespass to chattels may apply to Internet conduct. One
court delineated the elements for an unauthorized access based trespass to
chattels claim, stating that a plaintiff must establish that "(1) defendant
intentionally and without authorization interfered with plaintiffs possessory
interest in the computer system; and (2) defendant's unauthorized use
proximately resulted in damage to plaintiff. '239 Applied to open wireless
access, users' access without authorization 240 may interfere with the plaintiff
network operator's wireless network in a manner sufficient to satisfy the first
element. Turning to damages, courts have found that draining processing
power or diminishing system capacity, even in small amounts, may satisfy
the damage requirement under a trespass to chattels claim.241 This view of
damages seems to encompass the potentially minimal amount of bandwidth
loss and system strain caused by the typical users of open wireless networks.
In contrast, different courts' interpretations of the doctrine support the
contention that trespass to chattels does not apply to open wireless access. A
Tennessee court limited the doctrine of trespass to chattels to movable
property.242 Under this view, unauthorized access of a network does not
238 Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV99-7654-HLH, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12987, at *17 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000).
239 Bidder's Edge, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1069-70.
240 The issue of unauthorized access is discussed at length in the previous two
sections. For the sake of brevity, the debate will not be rehashed in this Section.
241 CompuServe, Inc., v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1023 (S.D.
Ohio 1997); see also Bidder's Edge, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1071.
242 Inventory Locator Serv., L.L.C. v. Partsbase, Inc., No. 02-2695, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 32680, at *34-37 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 6, 2005).
1170 [Vol. 67:1123
POLICING THE WIRELESS WORLD
involve movable property, thus precluding the applicability of the doctrine.
Even if the doctrine does apply, damages present an additional, potentially
insurmountable, hurdle. Some courts have been unwilling to apply trespass to
chattels where the conduct at issue causes no damage or impairment to the
system.243 Users of open wireless networks may cause only negligible
impairment to the system, and thus not meet the required level of damages to
sustain a trespass to chattels claim.
Even in the event the doctrine does apply, users may be able to escape
liability by asserting apparent consent. Users may argue that the lack of
encryption, password protection, or other security measures on a wireless
network grants them the apparent consent to access the open network.
Apparent consent operates under a reasonableness standard. 244 It seems
reasonable that if users' laptops detect wireless signals that allow them to
connect, the network operator consents to their access. 245
Federal law, state law, and the common law provide a myriad of relevant
legal regimes. Unfortunately, the variances between the substance and
application of these laws confuse the issue of the legality of open Wi-Fi
access and leave results unpredictable. How the law treats open wireless
networks has far-reaching policy and societal implications and deserves
measured consideration.
VII. A WAY OF MAKING SENSE OF OPEN WI-FI ACCESS
Examining the case of Benjamin Smith, the most compelling question is
not whether his conduct violates the law, but whether it should violate the
law-should the law prohibit casual users from accessing open Wi-Fi
networks? This Part addresses the policy behind unauthorized access law and
makes a proposal for the construction of a statute regulating unauthorized
access.
243 Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 300 (Cal. 2003); see also Ticketmaster, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12987, at *17.
244 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892 cmt. c (1979).
245 Of course, one can reasonably argue the other side: just because network
operators leave their WLANs unsecured does not mean they consent to users accessing
their networks.
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A. The Wi-Fi Policy Debate: Property, Radio, or Somewhere in
Between
Behind the legal debate over the legality of accessing open wireless
networks are competing conceptualizations of the nature of the technology at
issue. Wi-Fi networks allow widespread public access to the Internet with
minimal physical limitations. Wireless networking technology continually
evolves; now consumers can use simple add-ons to expand the range of
wireless networks to upward of fifty miles. 246 Access to a wireless network
may be provided by any number of sources, from residential consumers to
businesses. This free availability mirrors the public availability of websites
on the Internet.247 However, consumers who deploy Wi-Fi networks may still
intend for some aspects of the network to remain private. This represents the
conundrum of Wi-Fi authorization and access: consumers make Wi-Fi
networks publicly available, but do not necessarily want other users to have
unfettered access to the network.
Open wireless technology can be conceptualized by the use of two
competing analogies: property rights and radio signals. Wireless networks
may be viewed as an extension of the network operator's property, with
unauthorized access of the network concomitantly viewed as theft or
trespass.248 Alternatively, an open wireless network may be viewed as a
radio signal, where access of the network is implicitly authorized (and
therefore legal) by the public broadcast of the signal. Each of these
conceptualizations reflects differing views regarding rights of use and access
and has important economic and public policy implications.249
246 See Hines, supra note 43 ("A signal enhancer available at your local RadioShack
can give someone access from as far as 50 miles away.").
247 See Kern, supra note 41, at 124.
248 "This is very similar to you walking down the street where a store has apples and
oranges, and you grab one and keep going." Jay Lyman, Floridian Faces Wireless
Trespassing Charges, TECH NEWS WORLD, July 8, 2005,
http://www.technewsworld.com/story/44501.html. (quoting Roger Entner, Vice President
of Wireless Telecom at Ovum. Mr. Entner goes on to note the proliferation of
unauthorized wireless access (and how it may result in the increased cost of bandwidth
for all network users) before concluding that "[j]ust because it's happening, and I think
it's happening frequently, doesn't make it right.") Id.
249 There is a robust debate in the literature regarding cyberproperty and spectrum
regulation. See infra notes 250-57. This Section endeavors only to briefly explain these
competing conceptualizations and their policy and economic impact; a thorough analysis
or comprehensive theory of the Internet is outside the scope of this Note.
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The root of the "cyberspace as place" 250 concept lies in metaphor and
user experience-popular culture refers to the Internet in spatial terms and
users often engage in conduct online (such as online shopping) that creates
the sensation of entering or using a physical space.251 Existing solely as a
theoretical notion, the idea of cyberspace as a place has little practical
impact, but in many cases courts have seized this concept and in a sense
transformed the place metaphor from a descriptive tool to a guiding rule.252
Using the place metaphor, courts may evaluate cyberspace claims in a
manner analogous to property 253-a potentially harmful approach in the area
of Wi-Fi.
Defining open wireless networks in terms of property rights may lead to
a policy of closed access and result in economic inefficiencies. If courts
conceive of cyberspace as a place, their logical response would be to
construct a regulatory structure analogous to that which regulates real
property. 254 This would in essence confer a proprietary right to the owners of
250 The concept of "cyberspace as place" has been addressed by a number of
commentators. See Hunter, supra note 61; Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91
CAL. L. REv. 521 (2003); Patricia L. Bellia, Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
2164 (2004); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 63-84 (1999)
[hereinafter CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE]; David R. Johnson & David Post,
Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1367 (1996);
Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1403 (1996) [hereinafter
The Zones of Cyberspace]; James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright,
Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1413 (1992). Interestingly, the
term "cyberspace" borrows from the world of fiction, with the term first espoused by
William Gibson in his 1984 novel NEUROMANCER. See VINCENT Mosco, THE DIGITAL
SUBLIME: MYTH, POWER, AND CYBERSPACE 11 (2004).
251 See Lemley, supra note 250, at 523; Hunter, supra note 61, at 446; Lessig, supra
note 250, at 1403 ("Cyberspace is a place. People live there. They experience all the sorts
of things that they experience in real space, there.").
252 See Hunter, supra note 61, at 472-500; Lemley, supra note 250, at 527-29.
Certainly, courts must apply physical-world laws to the Internet, however, problems may
arise when courts extend the property conception of the Internet without limitation. See
id. at 542.
253 Id.
254 See Hunter, supra note 61, at 503:
If we think of cyberspace as a place, then the legal response would be to
impose a real-property-based regulatory structure on the place. Moreover, because
our physical world property system is based on private land tenure, the legal reaction
is to use real-property mechanisms to delineate and fence off these new property
entitlements in cyberspace.
For insight into the Department of Justice's perspective, see Richard W. Downing,
Shoring Up the Weakest Link: What Lawmakers Around the World Need to Consider in
Developing Comprehensive Laws to Combat Cybercrime, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
705, 711-12 (2005) (discussing an approach to legislating cybercrime, including
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wireless networks; accessing such networks, even if open, would be the
equivalent of walking on to that particular owner's lawn. As the law
discourages such conduct in the real world, open access would be
discouraged in the cyberspace world. The fragmentation of wireless networks
caused by conferring property rights on network operators leads to economic
inefficiency. Free and open access of the Internet enhances the Internet's
value.255
At its onset, the Internet embodied several attributes characteristically
associated with commons. 256 However, propertization that allows network
operators to limit access may act as an enclosure on the Internet commons.
Granting propriety rights in wireless networks may create a tragedy of the
anticommons, thereby excluding users from access of the Internet and
preventing users from realizing the benefits that the Internet brings to
society.257 In contrast, the radio signal conceptualization of wireless
networks mitigates the economically inefficient splintering caused by courts'
adopting the property-based conceptualization.
The radio conceptualization of Wi-Fi supports the notion of free access
for open wireless networks. WLAN operators must set up a WAP, essentially
a small radio tower, with which they broadcast the wireless signal over a
publicly available radio spectrum.258 Wi-Fi's use of unlicensed radio
unauthorized access, that involves creating consistency between conduct criminalized in
the physical world and conduct criminalized in the virtual world).
255 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 171 (2001) [hereinafter THE
FuTuRE OF IDEAS] ("It is this general feature [free and open access] of the Net that makes
the Net so valuable to users and a source of great innovation. And to the extent that
individual sites begin to impose their own rules of exclusion, the value of the network as
a network declines.").
256 Hunter, supra note 61, at 503.
257 See id. at 509 ("Anticommons property exists where multiple owners have a
right to exclude others from a scarce resource, and no one has an effective privilege of
use."). Not all commentators agree about the viability of rejecting a property-based
regime for regulating access on the Internet, with one commentator noting the gaps in the
position taken by critics of the property rule approach. See Bellia, supra note 250, at
2209-10 ("[A]rguments based on 'overpropertization' of informational goods or of the
Internet fail to explain why the law nonetheless should protect against uses that cause
physical harm to a computer system; [or] why, if the law does protect against such
physical harm, it should not also protect against economic harms.").
258 See supra Part II. A rich scholarly debate exists over the proper regulation of
spectrum, typically positioning a property based regime against a commons approach.
See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Spectrum Abundance and the Choice Between Private and
Public Control, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2007 (2003); Kevin Werbach, Supercommons:
Toward a Unified Theory of Wireless Communication, 82 TEX. L. REv. 863 (2004);
Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communications, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
25 (2002); Patrick S. Ryan, Wireless Communications and Computing at a Crossroads:
New Paradigms and Their Impact on Theories Governing the Public's Right to Spectrum
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frequencies provides the impetus for the radio conceptualization of wireless
networking. This notion of Wi-Fi functions as a foil to the property
conceptualization. Rather than distributing private rights in networking that
would restrict public access, publicly broadcasted (and hence publicly
available) networks presumptively grant open access to all. This open access
paradigm embodies a commons approach to wireless networking that better
reflects the characteristics of the Internet and may help realize higher
network optimization and generate other positive economic outcomes.
A commons policy for WLANs increases network productivity and
produces positive externalities. Commons may be defined as a "situation in
which a resource is openly accessible to all users regardless of the users'
identity or intended use of the resource. '259 Applied to Wi-Fi, open wireless
networks would be available for unfettered public access. For networking,
open access correlates with increased network productivity. Metcalfe's law
holds that the value of a network increases exponentially with the
incorporation of additional interconnections to the network. 260 Allocating
WLANs as a common resource would introduce more interconnections into
the Internet network and correspondingly the value of the network would
increase exponentially. 26 1 Further, maintaining open access reflects a policy
toward favoring technological innovation.262 Cumulatively, these benefits
illustrate the positive economic effects of a commons approach to Wi-Fi.
Wireless networking presents the opportunity for a comedy of the
commons, whereby open access correlates to greater social value. The
comedy of the commons functions as the opposite of the tragedy of the
commons, 263 and "arises where open access to a resource leads to scale
Access, 3 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 239 (2005); Thomas W. Hazlett, Spectrum
Tragedies, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 242 (2005). Given that Wi-Fi uses radio frequencies that
are unlicensed by the FCC, this Note avoids entering the debate over the proper
regulation of radio spectrum and instead focuses on the commons-like attributes of
unlicensed radio frequencies.
259 Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons
Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 933 (2005) (citing THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra
note 255, at 19-20).
260 See GILDER, supra note 25, at 73.
261 Aside from social value, a technological gain may also be realized due to the
nature of computer networks. Networking protocols enable interconnection,
interoperability, and data transfer, all of which may be made more efficient by an
increased number of participating computers in a network. Frischmann, supra note 259,
at 928.
262 THE FuTuRE OF IDEAS, supra note 255, at 264-68.
263 The tragedy of the commons, popularly introduced by Garrett Hardin, holds that
open access to a common resource ultimately leads to degradation of the resource
because the resource users' individual gains in using the resource will always exceed the
distributed cost to all of the deprivation of the resource. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of
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returns-greater social value with greater use of the resource." 264 As
mentioned above, adding users to a network enhances the social and
technological value of the network. These positive externalities serve as the
foundation for the comedy of the commons and illustrate the potential
positive economic effects of open access under a radio conceptualization of
Wi-Fi.265
Reconciling the potential economic benefits of open access with the
individual right to enjoy one's property requires consideration not only of the
conceptualization of Wi-Fi technology, but the stakeholders involved in
wireless networking. The property and radio conceptualizations serve as
useful tools in evaluating the nature of Wi-Fi technology, but do not fully
capture the range of interests that come to bear on the issue. Owners and
operators of WAPs typically must contract with ISPs in order to obtain
service. In turn, ISPs often set terms and conditions governing the end-users'
Internet usage-a contractual relationship indicative of ISPs' stake in Wi-Fi
policy. Hardware manufacturers have a stake by providing the equipment
necessary to enable wireless networking. At an even broader level,
telecommunications companies provide the foundation for Internet usage by
providing the broadband pipes used by computers to communicate. 266 The
the Commons, SCIENCE, Dec. 13, 1968, at 1243-48, available at
http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/reprint/162/3859/1243.pdf.
264 Frischmann, supra note 259, at 928 (citing Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the
Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 711
(1986)).
265 Countervailing opinions exist over whether open access in fact leads to a tragedy
of the commons as opposed to a comedy of the commons. Generally, these commentators
assert that increased usage decreases the availability of bandwidth, which negatively
impacts the experience of all network users. See Brett Frischmann, Privitization and
Commercialization of the Internet Infrastructure: Rethinking Market Intervention into
Government and Government Intervention into the Market, 2 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L.
REv. 1, 27 (2000/2001) ("Internet infrastructure consumption is often nonrivalrous; for
example, during off-peak hours.... At some threshold, determined in terms of aggregate
capacity being used, however, nonrivalrous consumption turns rivalrous and congestion
problems arise."); see also Benjamin, supra note 258, at 2015.
266 The dynamic between broadband carriers and content providers may shift in a
manner impacting end-users of the Internet. In an interview with BusinessWeek, SBC
CEO Edward Whitacre fired a shot across the bow to content providers, stating:
How do you think they're going to get to customers? Through a broadband
pipe. Cable companies have them. We have them. Now what they would like to do
is use my pipes free, but I ain't going to let them do that because we have spent this
capital and we have to have a return on it. So there's going to have to be some
mechanism for these people who use these pipes to pay for the portion they're using.
Why should they be allowed to use my pipes? The Internet can't be free in that
sense, because we and the cable companies have made an investment and for a
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nature of Wi-Fi technology and the number of stakeholders relevant to Wi-Fi
policy raise challenges to legislation addressing the legality of open wireless
access.
Sensible Wi-Fi policy requires balancing individual and societal benefits
while considering the range of interested parties. The property and radio
conceptualizations serve as the ends to a continuum of conduct; the critical
question is at what point on this continuum does open wireless access fall?
The stronger argument lies on the side of open access akin to the radio
conceptualization. Open access results in greater economic and social
benefits. However, access cannot be completely unfettered. Under the right
circumstances, stakeholders in WLANs should be able to assert property-like
control over their network. One way to reconcile the competing interests and
players in the Wi-Fi policy arena is to establish a regime of presumptive open
access, a method illustrated by the following proposed statute.
B. A Model Unauthorized Access Statute and Analysis
The proposed statute is intended as a model rule regarding unauthorized
access. As with the Model Penal Code, the aim of the statute is adoption by
the states (though the principles embodied in the statute could perhaps be
incorporated into federal law).2 67 The argument for statutory uniformity cuts
Google or Yahoo! or Vonage or anybody to expect to use these pipes for free is
nuts!
Patricia O'Connell, ed., At SBC, It's All About "Scale and Scope," BUS.WK.
ONLINE, Nov. 7, 2005,
http://www.businessweek.com/@@n34h*lUQu7KtOwgA/magazine/content/05_45/
b3958092.htm.
267 Although the CFAA may regulate open wireless access conduct, states may be
better positioned to address this conduct than the federal government. Regulating
unauthorized access via state law more adequately reflects the distribution of power
between the federal and state government-specifically, the Constitution's grant to the
states of the police power. See ERWIN CHEMER1NSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 230 (2d ed. 2002) ("[A] key difference between federal and state
governments is that only the latter possess the police power.").
Certainly one can make the argument that the vast expanse of the Internet better
comports with federal regulation via the Commerce Clause. However, state regulation
seems more apt to particular instances of unauthorized access contained wholly within a
particular state's jurisdiction. Further, joyriding seems outside the purpose of the CFAA.
See Doe v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock Med. Ctr., No. 00-100-M, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10704, at *13 (D.N.H. July 19, 2001) ("[T]he CFAA's unequivocal purpose is to deter
and punish those who intentionally access computer files and systems without authority
and cause harm.") (citations omitted).
However, the FBI has at least hinted at the possibility that the CFAA may be
interpreted otherwise. In a widely circulated email, an FBI agent from Pittsburgh stated
that: "Identifying the presence of a wireless network may not be a criminal violation,
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against trespass to chattels as a viable means for asserting liability for open
wireless access. Providing uniform statutes would give a clear indication of
permissible conduct, in contrast to trespass to chattels, a doctrine that courts
may apply in an inconsistent, confusing, and potentially outcome
determinative fashion.268 Uniform statutes mitigate user confusion and focus
liability on the conduct at issue rather than the jurisdiction in which it takes
place.
The model statute covers a range of conduct, with a primary focus on the
character of authorization. The most notable feature of the statute is what it
does not regulate-under the model statute, users may engage in open
wireless access without fear of legal repercussions.
1. The Model Statute
§ 100.1 Definitions
(1) "Access" means to gain entry to, instruct, intercept, store data in,
retrieve data from, communicate with or otherwise make use of, any
resources of a computer, computer network, or computer system.
(2) "Authorization" means the express or implied consent of the
principal. Consent may be expressly granted or denied by giving verbal or
written notice, including posting or displaying notice electronically. In the
context of computer networking, the implementation of security measures
indicates a denial of consent, unless the principal otherwise grants express
consent, and in the absence of security measures, there exists a rebuttable
presumption of implied consent regardless of whether express consent has
been granted. This presumption may be overcome by clear and convincing
evidence that shows no reasonable user would believe he or she would have
authorization.
(3) "Computer" means an electronic, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic,
or other data processing device, which performs logical, arithmetic, memory,
or storage functions by the manipulations of electronic, magnetic, radio
however, there may be criminal violations if the network is actually accessed including
theft of services, interception of communications, misuse of computing resources, up to
and including violations of the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Statute[.]" War,
Peace, or Stalemate, supra note 32, at *44 (emphasis removed); see also Michael J.
Madison, Rights ofAccess and the Shape of the Internet, 44 B.C. L. REv. 433, 480 (2003)
("Despite its anti-hacking origins, the CFAA, and subsections 1030(a)(2) and 1030(a)(5)
in particular, appears on its face to justify interpreting the statute as an access-control
regime .... ).
268 Additionally, accepting trespass to chattels as applicable to WLANs has serious
implications for the conception of wireless networking. Subjecting Wi-Fi to trespass to
chattels implies a notion of cyberspace as property, a potentially dangerous and
inaccurate conception with legal implications beyond the area of open wireless access.
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wave, or light wave impulses, and includes all input, output, processing,
storage, software, or communication facilities which are connected or related
to or operating in conjunction with such a device.
(4) "Computer network" means the interconnection of communication
lines (including microwave, radio wave, or other means of electronic
communication) with a computer through remote terminals, or a complex
consisting of two or more interconnected computers, or any system that
provides communications between one or more computers or computer
systems.
(5) "Computer system" means a set of interconnected computer
equipment intended to operate as a cohesive system.
(6) "Damage" means any impairment to the integrity or availability of a
computer, computer network, or computer system.
(7) "Loss" means any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of
responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the
computer, computer network, or computer system to its condition prior to the
offenses, and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other economic loss or
consequential damage incurred because of the unauthorized access.
(8) "Person" means any individual, firm, corporation, educational
institution, financial institution, governmental entity, or any legal or other
entity.
(9) "Principal" means any person who is the owner, operator, manager,
or otherwise responsible for a computer, computer network, or computer
system.
(10) "Security measures" mean any device, coding system, encryption,
password protection, or other means utilized to prevent a person from
gaining access to a principal's computer, computer network, or computer
system.
§ 100.2 Unauthorized Access
A person commits the crime of unauthorized access when he or she
knowingly accesses a computer, computer network or computer system
without the authorization of the principal of the computer, computer network
or computer system.
§ 100.3 Offense Level and Civil Action
A person convicted of the crime of unauthorized access commits a felony
offense. The offense level may be adjusted upward based on damage and/or
loss caused by the unauthorized access. An individual subject to harm by the
unauthorized access may bring a civil action under the laws of this state to
compensate for the damage and/or loss caused by the unauthorized access.
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§ 100.4 Conflict of Law
This section is in no way intended to abrogate an Internet Service
Provider's rights under principles of state contract law.
2. Analysis
The operative provision of the statute, Section 100.2, contains standard
language prohibiting unauthorized access. Most state statutes in some way,
shape, or form, prohibit intentional, knowing, purposeful, and/or willful...
access without authorization. 269 This statute varies slightly from the language
used by most states. For instance, it does not include the language "in excess
of authorization," found in many state statutes. Ultimately, this language is
redundant; a principal's express consent would likely specify the terms of
access, thus any access beyond those terms would inherently be "without
authorization," which is conduct already addressed by the statute.
Additionally, because the model statute focuses on authorization and
circumventing security, it does not criminalize attempted unauthorized
access, as do some states. Lastly, the structure of the statute separates the
"accesses" phrase and the "without authorization" phrase, which indicates
that the mens rea applies only to the word "accesses" and not to "without
authorization."
The choice of a "knowing" mens rea reflects a decision to encompass a
broad range of conduct. States effectively make a choice between an
intentional/purposeful mens rea and a knowing mens rea.270 Under a
purposeful mens rea, it must be the conscious object of a person to commit
unauthorized access of the specific network in question. In contrast, with a
knowing mens rea, a person need only be aware that the unauthorized access
may result in the access of the specific network in question. This distinction
is particularly significant in the wireless world, where multiple wireless
networks may be available to a person at a given time. The intentional mens
rea could limit a person's culpability to instances where he or she had the
conscious object of accessing one specific wireless network among the many
potentially available networks. This seems unduly limiting and could lead to
an unjust result for network operators. The knowing mens rea leads to a more
sensible result, whereby a person is still culpable if he or she is aware of the
possibility of accessing one network among many. The choice of mens rea
reflects a broader decision to encompass a broader range of conduct, with the
true determining factor resting on authorization.
The definitions contained in Section 100.1 cover a range of access
conduct and subject matter by diverse users. The defined terms of the statute
269 See supra Part IV.A.
270 See supra note 83.
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borrow heavily from a variety of state statutes as well as the CFAA. 2 7 1 The
terms "computer," "computer network," and "computer system," encompass
a range of electronic medium. Relevant to wireless, the term "computer
network" includes "any system that provides communications between one
or more computer or computer systems," indicating that wireless networking
falls within the scope of the statute. "Person" is liberally defined to include a
range of users from individuals to corporate entities. The use of "principal" is
intended to reflect the complexities of network administration. Many statutes
define unauthorized access in terms of the "owner." Although the owner can
be easily discerned in the context of a residential network, corporate or small
business networks present an additional problem. In these situations, the
owner may have little or nothing to do with the actual network
administration. The definition of "principal" allows for the possibility that
other persons may be the appropriate source for consent to access. Just as the
players ("person" and "principal") and the parts ("computer," "computer
network," and "computer system") are broadly defined, so is the term that
brings them together: "access."
The term "access" includes an array of conduct while at the same time
avoiding the pitfalls illuminated by a handful of state cases. The definition of
"access" is intended to include any sort of communication or interaction with
a computer. For wireless networking, the radio signal emitted by a WAP
would constitute the resource of a computer network (if not an aspect of the
network itself) and any interaction with that signal would constitute access.
Notably, the definition does not include the term "to approach." Including
this term would create the same confusion dealt with by the courts in State v.
Allen and State v. Riley.2 72 Conduct that likely constitutes "to approach"
would fall under "interaction." But eliminating the term "to approach" from
the definition shifts the interpretive focus from access to its rightful place:
authorization.
Authorization is the key operative term of the statute; culpability only
attaches in instances where a person does not have consent to access the
271 The term "access" is a mix of language common to most statutes. See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 502(b)(1) (West 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5.5-101(10) (2004).
"Computer" is provided as defined by Colorado (though other statutes contain similar
language). See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5.5-101(2) (2004). The term "computer network"
combines aspects of the language from Colorado and Florida. See COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-5.5-101(3) (2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 815.03(4) (West 2006). The definition of
"computer system" is common to many states. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-23(g) (West
2005). The concept of a "principal" borrows from South Carolina, although that state's
code does not technically define the term. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-16-10(1) (West Supp.
2005). The CFAA also informs several terms, including "damage," "loss," and "person."
See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e) (Supp. 1112003).
272 See supra Part VI.B. 1.
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network.273 The definition provides for express or implied consent. Express
consent can be given verbally (i.e., a principal informing a person he or she
can use the principal's network) or by written notice. Express consent plays
less of a role in the context of computer networking. This is designed to
insulate against the potentially absurd results the use of notice might create in
the wireless networking environment. For example, posting a sign
prohibiting access seems impractical and ineffectual given that the range
provided by a WAP would likely extend well past the immediate location
where the sign is visible.274
Security measures play a critical role in determining liability in the
computer networking environment. A principal's implementation of security
measures functions as the principal's denial of consent. Specifically, if the
principal makes use of any reasonable means275 to prevent a person from
gaining access, the principal in essence establishes that such a person lacks
authorization. This lack of authorization may of course be overcome by the
express consent of the principal (i.e., the principal giving the person a
password or network key to log on to a wireless network), but absent express
consent, a person would lack authorization. Not only do security measures
impact authorization when they are put in place, but they also have an effect
when omitted as well.
The absence of security measures gives rise to implied consent, and
hence, authorization. The definition of authorization provides that where a
principal does not implement security measures, a person has implied
consent that gives him or her authorization to access a computer network.
276
Implied consent exists regardless of whether express consent has been
granted. This implied consent is not absolute. Rather, the lack of security
measures creates a rebuttable presumption that the principal has granted
273 In many ways this is a practical implementation of Kerr's views on unauthorized
access statutes. See Kerr, supra note 66, at 1648 ("The functional effect of this broad
construction [of access] is to eliminate access as a limit on the scope of unauthorized
access statutes, and to place major weight on the meaning of authorization .... ").
274 The range of a wireless network can easily be extended to several miles beyond
the exact location of the WAP. See Hines, supra note 43.
275 The reasonable means language is designed to include as of yet undeveloped
security technologies that may apply in the future, while precluding individuals from
claiming suspect security measures (for example, sitting on a porch chair with a bullhorn
yelling at others to stay off your network).
276 The construction of this provision reflects the stance taken by New York. See
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 156.05 (McKinney Supp. 2006). The model statute differs from New
York in that it allows the principal to rebut (subject to a high evidentiary standard) the
presumption created by a lack of security measures. This accommodates unique factual
situations. Suppose a hack opened a normally secure state government network (the state
treasury); the government would be allowed to present clear and convincing evidence that
a person knew that he or she did not have authorization to be on the website.
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implied consent. The principal may present clear and convincing evidence
that shows no reasonable person would believe he or she had authorization to
access. This approach contrasts with the handful of states that allow an
affirmative defense whereby defendants may show that they reasonably
believed they had authorization. 277 The model statute changes two things: it
(1) shifts the burden from the defendant to the plaintiff, and (2) heightens the
evidentiary standard to clear and convincing evidence. These changes are
indicative of a policy favoring open access in the absence of conduct to the
contrary by the principal, and of encouraging network operators to
implement security measures lest they face overcoming the high bar set by
the clear and convincing standard.
The expansive definitions of parts, players, and access, in conjunction
with the comprehensive definition of authorization, indicate an important
policy decision: culpability should rest on whether the conduct at issue is
authorized and not on the exact nature of the conduct itself. People,
technology, and access conduct are defined broadly to avoid interpretive
problems regarding whether the model statute covers a particular form of
access. Instead, the model statute focuses on authorization: whether a
principal consents to a person's access conduct. The question of
authorization is narrower than that of access-a distinction reflected in how
the model statute defines the level of the offense.
The severity of the model statute's punishment derives from the statute's
focus on authorization and security. The model statute establishes
unauthorized access as a felony offense. 2 78 In several states unauthorized
access is only a misdemeanor offense. This difference can be attributed to the
importance of authorization and security measures. The model statute is
constructed in such a manner that if a person is culpable under the statute, he
or she must have violated the express edict of the principal or circumvented
the principal's security measures. In contrast, the states that classify
unauthorized access as a misdemeanor typically criminalize less severe
conduct, such as accessing an open wireless network where the principal is
silent on consent and no security measures are in place. The model statute
criminalizes more severe conduct, and thus the corresponding punishment
should be more severe as well.
The model statute also differs with regard to its consideration of
damages. In contrast to several states that tie the level of offense to the level
277 For example, in Ohio, the defendants may assert the affirmative defense that they
reasonably believed their access was authorized. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2913.03(C)(1) (West 1997).
278 The phrase "felony offense" is intended to mean a mid-level felony. However,
given that states have differing felony standards, providing a specific grade of felony here
is impractical.
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of damage or loss, the model statute grants the prosecutor discretion to adjust
the level of the offense based on the damage and/or loss caused by a person's
unauthorized access. This reflects a policy choice to eliminate the potential
for "one dollar inequity" 279 and acknowledges the difficulties in determining
damage and loss in these situations. The statute further contemplates
damages and loss by empowering a principal to bring a civil suit to recover
for the harm that the unauthorized access caused. The impact of damage and
loss again reflects the model statute's focus on more severe conduct. Damage
and loss are difficult to determine and inappropriate solely for the purpose of
determining liability in and of itself. However, under the model statute,
damage and loss do not determine liability, but are instead ancillary factors.
Because damage and loss do not come to bear on liability itself, the statute
mitigates the impact of these difficult determinations.
The last provision of the model statute, Section 100.3, addresses the
potential for conflict with state contract law. Most ISPs limit the ability of
their subscribers to make their wireless network freely available to the
public. The potential exists for a person to engage in permissible access of an
open wireless network (i.e., the principal expressly or impliedly consents to
access, taking the person's access outside the scope of the model statute),
while at the same time causing subscribers to violate the terms of their
agreement with the ISPs. Section 100.3 disallows subscribers from asserting
that they are absolved from liability to the ISP because the third party's
access is permissible under state law. This provision specifically maintains
the ISPs' right to bring a suit based on the terms of their agreement with
subscribers.
Given this Note's focus, the application of the model statute to open
wireless access is of obvious interest. The definitions provided by the statute
cover all the components of an open wireless access event: "computer
network" encompasses wireless networks, "person" encompasses potential
wireless network users, and "principal" covers wireless network operators.
Users who then log on to the wireless network engage in "access" as defined
by the statute. The analysis hinges on authorization. If the principal has
implemented security measures (typically encryption or password protection)
and users circumvent these measures, they are liable under the statute. If the
principal has expressly prohibited access by notice, users who then access are
in violation of the statute. If the principal has not provided express
prohibition nor implemented security measures, users' access of the
principal's wireless network is presumptively valid. Unless the principal
satisfies the high evidentiary threshold set by the statute and shows that users
279 When a statute defines an offense as a felony (that would otherwise be a
misdemeanor) if the loss caused is $1,000 or greater, $1 may mean the difference
between a felony and a misdemeanor-a potentially arbitrary and inequitable result.
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did not have his or her implied consents, users' open wireless access will not
violate the statute. Assuming that users do in fact engage in unauthorized
access, they will be liable for a felony offense with the prosecutor to
determine the grade of felony in light of the damage and loss caused by the
unauthorized access. Additionally, the principal may bring a civil suit to
recover from the offending users.
The proposed model statute provides a measured legal response to the
issue of open wireless access. Wi-Fi networks raise important policy
questions regarding free access and individual rights. The law must be
sensitive to this tension and endeavor to provide an appropriate balance
between these sometimes competing interests.
VIII. CONCLUSION
So what becomes of Benjamin Smith? The answer remains unclear.
Regardless of his fate, his case has raised important questions of Wi-Fi
policy. How should the law apply to those casual users who happen across a
wireless network and browse the Web? More importantly, how should
society provide for the growth and development of the Internet-do we
follow a path of propertization or chart a course for the Internet commons?
Technology continually affects the lives of nearly all Americans. The
growth of the Internet has changed the way people receive information, shop,
communicate, and countless other aspects of daily life. Wireless technology
represents the next evolution of Internet growth, taking users away from their
home and incorporating the Internet into a more diverse range of everyday
activities. Widespread wireless access may help to break down
socioeconomic barriers by allowing users to access the Internet who might
otherwise be unable to connect in their homes. Preserving free access allows
the Internet to continue to grow and society to benefit.
It is imperative that the law sensibly accommodate Internet growth.
Implementing law that legalizes access of open wireless networks does just
that. Allowing access while protecting the right to secure one's network
represents a sensible balance that furthers the development of the Internet
and guards the social value created by the Internet commons. By enacting
law that embodies a respect for open access to the Internet, society protects
the wireless evolution of today and ensures the continued benefits from the
Internet evolution of tomorrow.
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